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Abstract  
When introduced to mainstream psychological research nearly a decade ago, mind wandering 
was defined as unintentional, internally-focused thought. The requirement of an absence of 
intention was critical in terms of the conceptualization of mind wandering because, for the 
better half of the past century, considerable research has examined intentional, internally-
focused thought. Thus, without the stipulation of an absence of intention, mind wandering 
would simply refer to a construct that has long been studied by researchers, which would 
therefore negate the utility of introducing the neologism “mind wandering” to the scientific 
community. Notwithstanding the critical importance of conceptualizing mind wandering as 
reflecting unintentional, internally-focused thoughts, in most studies on the topic, the requisite 
steps have not been taken to ensure that the reported mind wandering did in fact occur without 
intention. The foregoing is particularly problematic as it suggests that, in many studies, absent-
minded mind wandering might have been confounded with intentionally-generated thought. In 
the present series of studies, I examined this possibility at both the trait and state levels, and 
found that, (1) in studies of mind wandering, people do in fact experience and report 
intentional internally-focused thought as reflecting “mind wandering,” and (2) intentional and 
unintentional internally-focused thoughts are differentially related to certain critical measures 
of interest, which indicates that they are dissociable cognitive experiences. These results 
suggest a serious problem with the current state of the literature on mind wandering: Namely, 
that mind wandering, as initially conceptualized and introduced to psychological research as 
reflecting unintentional internally-focused thought, has likely been conflated with a very 
different mode of thinking (i.e., deliberately engaged thought). 
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On the theoretical importance of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional 
types of Mind Wandering 
 
"The less a science has advanced, the more its terminology tends to rest 
on an uncritical assumption of mutual understanding."  
(Quine, 1936, p. 90) 
 
The division of phenomena and constructs into binary distinctions has been an extremely 
useful tool in refining the conceptual and theoretical aspects of psychological research. Neisser 
(1963), in discussing thinking, famously observed that “nearly everyone who has touched the 
subject has divided mental processing into two (or more) kinds” (p. 1). The primary focus of this 
thesis, mind wandering – the unintentional shift of attention away from the external environment 
toward some other train of internally-focused thinking – was defined and developed in such a 
dichotomous way of thinking. Indeed, when Smallwood and Schooler (2006) first introduced the 
term ‘mind wandering’ to the scientific community nearly a decade ago, they proposed a 
dichotomous conceptualization of mind wandering as a cognitive state that is directly contrasted 
with, and defined in opposition to, intentional modes of thinking (such as goal-directed thinking; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006): 
 
“Mind wandering shares certain similarities with standard views of controlled processing, 
however, there is an important difference. Controlled processing is generally associated with the 
intentional pursuit of a goal. Mind wandering, however, often occurs without intention (Giambra, 
1995) or even awareness that one’s mind has drifted (Schooler, 2002; Schooler, Reichle, & 
Halpern, 2005)” (p. 946; Italics added).  
 
 It is important to note that introducing the term ‘mind wandering’ to the scientific 
community has utility only insofar as this cognitive experience is clearly distinguishable from 
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already-studied generic types of internally-guided thinking. Indeed, for the better half of the past 
century, considerable psychological research has examined thinking that occurs with deliberate 
intent (e.g., goal-directed thoughts, problem solving, etc.; e.g., Bargh, 1990; Bartlett, 1958; 
Bruner, Goodnow, & George 1956; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1972). Thus, if 
‘mind wandering’ is indistinguishable from these well-studied (intentional) modes of thinking, 
then there would be no utility to introducing the neologism “mind wandering” to the scientific 
community, as doing so would, at best, fail to make any useful contribution to scientific 
investigations, and at worst, produce to a false dichotomy that would very likely lead to 
confusions in the psychological literatures focused on human thinking. Thus, if the construct of 
mind wandering is not made operationally distinguishable from deliberately engaged cognitions, 
then it would be more fruitful for the scientific community to refrain from endorsing  the term 
‘mind wandering’ in the first place. Indeed, this was Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) line of 
reasoning in their seminal paper in which they introduced the term mind wandering – as a 
construct that is unique and distinguishable from deliberately engaged thought and controlled 
processing – to mainstream psychological science,. 
Notwithstanding the critical importance of conceptualizing mind wandering as reflecting 
unintentional, internally-focused thoughts, in many studies on the topic, the requisite steps have 
not been taken to ensure that the reported mind wandering did in fact occur without intention. 
That is, it was not confirmed that the thoughts being measured actually qualified – in accordance 
with the assumed definitions and theoretical interpretations – as “mind wandering,” particularly 
with regard to the stipulation of a lack of intentionality. Unfortunately, despite the conceptual 
importance of the absence of intentionality, mind wandering has been commonly operationally 
defined for participants as “thinking about task-unrelated things” (e.g., Levinson, Smallwood, & 
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Davidson, 2012; Seli, Carriere, Thomson, et al., 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; 
Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 
2008; Smallwood, Davies, Heim, Finnigan, Sudberry, et al., 2004; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & 
Heim, 2003; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). Importantly, this commonly employed 
operational definition of mind wandering clearly allows for, and indeed implicitly requires 
participants to report intentionally-engaged off-task thoughts as “mind wandering.” The 
foregoing is particularly problematic as it suggests that, in many studies, absent-minded mind 
wandering might have been confounded with intentionally-generated thought. 
 Given the importance of the foregoing for investigations of mind wandering, in the 
present work I sought to examine whether (1) people do in fact experience and report intentional 
internally-focused thought, and (2) these intentional thoughts are dissociable from their 
unintentional counterparts. Assuming that people do experience and report intentional mind 
wandering, that these thoughts are dissociable from unintentional mind wandering, and that (at 
least in some cases) intentional thoughts share different associations with certain variables, this 
would suggest a serious problem with the current state of the literature on mind wandering. 
Indeed, it would suggest that mind wandering, as initially conceptualized and introduced to 
psychological research as reflecting unintentional internally-focused thought, has likely been 
conflated with a very different mode of thinking (i.e., deliberately engaged thought). Such 
findings would provide clear evidence necessitating a change in our way of thinking about and 
studying mind wandering, and would suggest that, if researchers so desire to hold fast to the 
notion of mind wandering being a mode of thinking that is separate from controlled processing, 
then they must distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous types of internally focused 
thought.  
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 I began my investigation by examining the abovementioned possibilities at the trait level. 
In an initial study (Study 1), I explored the possibility that trait level deliberate (intentional) and 
spontaneous (unintentional) mind wandering differentially associated with measures of 
mindfulness as assessed by the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. In a follow-up study 
(Study 2), I then examined the hypothesis that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering 
ought to be associated with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptomatology. To 
foreshadow, in Study 1, I found that participants reported having experienced both deliberate and 
spontaneous trait-level mind wandering, and critically, that these different types of mind 
wandering were uniquely associated with certain aspects of mindfulness, thereby demonstrating 
that people do in fact experience (and are capable of reporting) deliberate mind wandering, and 
that deliberate and spontaneous types of mind wandering are dissociable as indicated by their 
unique associations with mindfulness. In Study 2, I found, as hypothesized, that spontaneous – 
but not deliberate – mind wandering predicted ADHD symptomatology, providing further 
support for the theoretical importance of distinguishing between these two types of mind 
wandering at the trait level.  
 Next, I then moved on to examine deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering at the 
state level. In the first study of this series (Study 3), I examined the possibility that participants 
lacking motivation to perform well on a laboratory task assessing sustained attention would more 
frequently engage in deliberate mind wandering than would their more highly motivated 
counterparts. In addition, I examined the possibility that the degree to which participants 
engaged in deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering during the sustained-attention task was 
uniquely predictive of their task performance. Study 4 extended the work of Study 3 by 
examining the influences of state-level deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in an 
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educational setting (i.e., during a video-recorded lecture). Finally, in Study 5, I examined the 
possibility that an experimental manipulation of task difficulty would differentially affect rates of 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering. In this series of studies, the primary findings were 
that (1) participants do indeed experience and report state-level deliberate mind wandering, (2) 
whereas in some cases, deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering are equally associated with 
performance measures (Study 3), in others, they uniquely predict performance (Study 4), and (3) 
a manipulation of task difficulty, although it did not affect overall rates of mind wandering 
across an “easy” and a “difficult” condition, it did influence the relative rates of each type of 
mind wandering.  
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Study 1 
The following work has been published in Psychological Research (Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2014). 
 
 Here we sought to demonstrate a dissociation between trait-level tendencies to mind-
wander spontaneously (unintentionally) and deliberately (intentionally). Participants completed 
online versions of the Mind Wandering Spontaneous (MW-S) and the Mind Wandering 
Deliberate (MW-D) self-report scales and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ). 
The results revealed that deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering were uniquely associated 
with some factors of the FFMQ.  Notably, while the MW-D and the MW-S were positively 
associated with each other, the MW-D was uniquely positively associated with the ‘Non-
Reactivity to Inner Experience’ factor of the FFMQ whereas the MW-S was uniquely negatively 
associated with this factor. We also showed that conflating deliberate and spontaneous mind 
wandering can result in a misunderstanding of how mind wandering is related to other traits. We 
recommend that studies assessing individual differences in mind wandering should distinguish 
between deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of mind wandering to avoid possibly erroneous 
conclusions. 
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Imagine an individual who is capable of sustaining her attention to a task when 
necessary, but spends much of her time deliberately mind wandering. Now imagine an individual 
who, despite his best intentions, cannot keep his mind from spontaneously wandering away from 
his everyday tasks. Here we have two individuals who frequently engage in mind wandering, but 
who do so for very different reasons. We refer to these two types of mind wandering as 
deliberate (intentional) and spontaneous (unintentional), respectively. Although there is reason to 
believe that these two types of mind wandering occur in everyday life (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 
2013), recent investigations of mind wandering have largely neglected the distinction between 
deliberate and spontaneous types of mind wandering, and have used trait-level questionnaires 
that do not distinguish between these subtypes, but instead provide an “overall” assessment of 
mind-wandering propensity. Building on recent work that has argued for the utility of treating 
mind wandering as a heterogeneous class of experiences (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), 
in the present study we demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between deliberate and 
spontaneous experiences of mind wandering at the individual-difference level. In particular, we 
show that these two types of mind wandering are differentially associated with other individual 
traits, and that conflating these types of mind wandering can lead to incorrect general 
conclusions about mind wandering and its associates.  
The idea that mind wandering occurs in deliberate and spontaneous forms has been 
around for quite some time. Indeed, in his early work on the topic, Giambra (1995) noted that: 
“TUITs [i.e., task-unrelated imagery and thoughts] may occupy awareness because they capture 
our attention – an uncontrolled shift – or because we have deliberately shifted our attention to 
them – a controlled shift” (p. 2). Despite this early distinction between spontaneous and 
deliberate mind wandering, almost all of the subsequent research on the topic has assessed 
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reports of “overall” mind wandering (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; 
McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin, Broadway, & Schooler, 2013; Seli, Carriere, 
Levene, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015; Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 
2003), overlooking the potentially interesting differences between deliberate and spontaneous 
mind wandering and their correlates. Critically, most of these researchers who have refrained 
from distinguishing between deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering have nevertheless 
discussed mind wandering in terms of 1) the unintentional drifting of one’s thoughts from a focal 
task toward inner, task-unrelated thoughts (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and 2) failures in 
executive control (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2010), with the working assumption that reports of mind 
wandering are not reflective of intentional or deliberate shifts in attention toward internal 
thought. Of course, if, as we argue here, at least some of the mind wandering that is indexed by 
researchers is of the deliberate, intentional, type, then discussing mind wandering exclusively in 
terms of “unintentional shifts” and “failures in executive control” will necessarily fail to capture 
the full range of this cognitive experience (for further discussion of the issues involved in 
measuring complex constructs, see, e.g., Smith, Fischer, & Fister, 2003).  
Although, to date, most researchers have overlooked Giambra’s early distinction between 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, in some recent work (Carriere et al., 2013) we 
sought to shed some light on this issue. In our study, we used an individual-differences approach 
to determine whether mind wandering relates to self-reported fidgeting. Our hypothesis was that 
fidgeting might be positively associated with mind wandering, to the extent that both result when 
we no longer maintain attentive control over the mind. In the course of our investigation, we 
developed a questionnaire intended to measure a unitary construct of mind wandering at the trait 
level. Instead we found that the questionnaire had a two-factor structure, and those two factors 
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were best captured by a distinction between spontaneous, uncontrolled mind wandering and 
deliberate, willful mind wandering. Although the two scales were highly positively correlated, 
when entered into a regression analysis as simultaneous predictors of fidgeting we found that 
spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering was uniquely correlated with fidgeting. 
Moreover, we similarly observed that one’s self-reported propensity to act without awareness 
(i.e., to act mindlessly) was uniquely associated with spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind 
wandering. Thus, consistent with Giambra’s (1995) early claim, these findings lend support to 
the hypothesis that there are indeed two distinguishable forms of mind wandering.  
While our recent work (Carriere et al., 2013) suggests that mind wandering can be 
separated into deliberate and spontaneous types, it is important to note that, in our study, when 
removing the shared variance between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering, we observed 
that it was always spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering that was associated with the 
dependent variables of interest (i.e., fidgeting and acting without awareness). This suggests the 
possibility that, although the distinction between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering is 
sound (as suggested by the factor analysis), this distinction might not be useful because both 
types of mind wandering might have similar – if not identical – consequences and associates. 
Moreover, spontaneous mind wandering may consistently be the more strongly associated of the 
two with other variables, which would result in it always providing the only unique prediction. 
Indeed, irrespective of whether one frequently engages in deliberate or spontaneous mind 
wandering, it is the case that, by definition, during both types of mind wandering one’s thoughts 
are not focused on the task at hand; as a result, one might expect to observe performance 
decrements and other similar associates in both cases. Thus, to demonstrate the practical utility 
in distinguishing between deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, one must demonstrate 
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that these two types of mind wandering can each be uniquely associated with some variables of 
interest. 
In our earlier work (Carriere et al., 2013) we focused on the association between mind 
wandering and mindlessness (acting without awareness), but mindlessness is just one aspect of 
the larger construct of mindfulness. In the present study, we therefore explored the possibility 
that deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering might differentially associate with some of the 
other important aspects mindfulness, as assessed by the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). True to its name, the FFMQ 
consists of five subscales measuring different facets of mindfulness, namely: (1) Non-Reactivity 
to One’s Inner Experience, (2) Observing/Attending to One’s Sensations, Perceptions, Thoughts, 
and Feelings, (3) Acting with Awareness, (4) Describing One’s Feelings, Sensations, and 
Experience (i.e., to oneself), and (5) Not Judging One’s Experiences (see Baer et al., 2006). 
These five facets of mindfulness provide a potentially fruitful testing ground for dissociating 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering because the facets include aspects of mental control, 
which ought to be related to people’s propensity to spontaneously mind wander, as well as 
aspects of deliberate exploration of inner experience, which ought to be related to people’s 
propensity to deliberately mind wander. Admittedly, as our study was exploratory we did not 
have any specific hypotheses with regard to the relation between spontaneous and deliberate 
mind wandering and the five facets of mindfulness, except for the relation between mind 
wandering and the third facet, which closely overlaps with our assessment of mindlessness in our 
previous work (Carriere et al., 2013). We felt that specific hypotheses were not critical because 
we simply sought to explore the possibility that distinguishing between these two types of mind 
wandering is of practical use. Importantly, given the purely exploratory nature of this study, we 
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sought to first observe the relations in a large sample and then replicate our observations in a 
second large sample. 
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
To demonstrate replication of our findings we analyzed data from two separate samples 
of students enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses at the University of Waterloo. The first 
sample consisted of 721 participants, and the second of 767 participants, all of whom completed 
every item of each questionnaire included in the study. Also included among the scales of 
interest (i.e., Mind Wandering: Spontaneous (MW-S), Mind Wandering: Deliberate (MW-D), 
and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; FFMQ) were various other questionnaires of 
interest to other researchers, but not analyzed for the present study. Collectively these 
questionnaires were given to participants in the first month of classes, and the order of 
presentation of the questionnaires was randomized across participants. Participants were 
therefore unaware of the relatedness of our scales. Participants received partial course credit for 
completing the questionnaires. 
Measures 
As in our previous work (Carriere et al., 2013), here we used the 4-item Mind 
Wandering: Deliberate (MW-D) scale and the 4-item Mind Wandering: Spontaneous (MW-S) 
scale to index deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, respectively. The MW-D includes 
items related to intentional mind wandering, such as: “I allow my thoughts to wander on 
purpose,” and the MW-S includes items related to unintentional mind wandering, such as: “I find 
my thoughts wandering spontaneously.” Both are scored using a seven-point Likert scale.  
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In addition to administering the two mind-wandering questionnaires, we measured 
mindfulness using the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006), which is 
comprised of five different scales that index various aspects of mindfulness, including: (1) Non-
Reactivity to Inner Experience, (2) Observing/Attending to Sensations, Perceptions, Thoughts, 
and Feelings, (3) Acting with Awareness, (4) Describing One’s Feelings, Sensations, and 
Experience, and (5) Non-Judging of Experience. The Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience scale 
includes items such as “I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them”; 
the Observing/Attending to Sensations scale includes items such as “I pay attention to sensations, 
such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face”; the Acting with Awareness scale includes 
(reverse coded) items such as “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the 
present”; the Describing One’s Feelings, Sensations, and Experience scale consists of items such 
as “I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings”; finally, the Non-Judging of 
Experience scale includes items such as the reverse coded item “I criticize myself for having 
irrational or inappropriate emotions.” Each of the five factors from the FFMQ is scored using a 
five-point Likert scale. The Acting with awareness scale of the FFMQ is notably comprised 
almost entirely of items taken from the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003) and all items on this scale are reverse-coded. We have previously used a similar 
subset of items from the MAAS as a measure of one’s general lack of attentiveness, by simply 
refraining from reverse-scoring the items (Carriere et al., 2013).  Likewise, as can be seen in the 
sample item, the Non-Judging of Experience scale of the FFMQ also consists entirely of reverse-
scored items that actually measure judgment of one’s experiences. 
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Study 1 Results 
Descriptive Analyses and Correlations 
Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s Alphas for the MW-D, MW-S, and all five facets of 
the FFMQ are presented in Table 1. All measures demonstrated good psychometric properties 
and reliability across both samples. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for all 
measures are presented in Table 2. As observed in previous work (Carriere et al., 2013), 
deliberate mind wandering (MW-D) showed a strong positive correlation with spontaneous mind 
wandering (MW-S). Moreover, the MW-D was associated with only three of the five 
mindfulness scales, whereas the MW-S was associated with all five of these scales. Finally, the 
correlation analysis showed strong relations of the MW-D and MW-S with the Acting with 
awareness scale of the FFMQ, as was initially demonstrated by Carriere et al., (2013; using the 
roughly equivalent MAAS-LO). For studies showing similar associations of other mind 
wandering and mindfulness measures, see Ottaviana and Couyoumdjian (2013), and Mrazek, 
Smallwood, and Schooler (2012). 
  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha for All Measures (Sample 1: N = 716; Sample 2: N = 762). 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 Mean (SD) Skew
a
 Kurtosis
b
 α Mean (SD) Skewa Kurtosisb α 
         
MW-D 4.39 (1.49) -0.23 -0.53 .890 4.41 (1.44) -0.24 -0.54 .883 
MW-S 4.03 (1.46) -0.13 -0.50 .879 4.31 (1.42) -0.23 -0.34 .881 
Non-reactivity to inner experience  3.07 (0.79) -0.06 -0.20 .862 3.00 (0.81) 0.03 0.02 .865 
Observing/attending to sensations 3.36 (0.74) -0.26 -0.13 .813 3.28 (0.75) -0.15 -0.26 .812 
Acting with awareness 2.32 (0.83) -0.17 -0.34 .890 2.17 (0.84) 0.01 -0.52 .895 
Describing one’s feelings                                                               3.10 (0.85) 0.04 -0.49 .878 3.05 (0.83) 0.06 -0.47 .878 
Non-judging of experience 2.08 (0.97) 0.07 -0.66 .920 2.01 (0.99) 0.15 -0.64 .923 
         
 
Note. 
a
 S.E. = .09, 
b
 S.E. = .18 
  
 
Table 2. Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients of All Measures (Sample 1: N = 716, Sample 2: N = 762) 
 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 MW-S 
Non-
reactivity 
Observing Acting Describing  
Non-
judging 
MW-S 
Non-
reactivity 
Observing Acting Describing  
Non-
judging 
             
MW-D .45*** .03   .17*** -.28***       -.05 -.14*** .40*** .00   .14*** -.26***       -.07 -.16*** 
MW-S - -.23*** .14*** -.60***    -.17*** -.36*** - -.19*** .17*** -.59***    -.22*** -.33*** 
Non-reactivity to inner experience   - .15*** .26***     .20*** .27***  - .11**  .19*** .17*** .22*** 
Observing/attending to sensations   - -.03     .15*** -.16***   -  -.06 .12** -.24*** 
Acting with awareness    -     .27*** .41***    - .26** .38*** 
Describing one’s feelings                                                                   - .17***     - .15**     
Non-judging of experience      -      - 
             
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, 2-tailed 
  
 
Regression Analyses  
As the MW-D and MW-S continued to be strongly correlated in these samples, we next 
sought to determine their unique contributions to each of the five facets of the FFMQ.  
Predicting the Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience Facet. We first conducted a multiple 
regression analysis predicting the Non-reactivity to Inner Experience facet of the FFMQ (FFMQ-
NR) with the MW-D and MW-S (see Table 3). In both samples the MW-D shows a significant, 
albeit small, positive semi-partial correlation with the FFMQ-NR. Given an essentially non-
existent zero-order correlation, this suggests that the positive relation of the MW-D and FFMQ-
NR was suppressed by the strong positive correlation of the MW-D and MW-S. Indeed, the 
MW-S continued to demonstrate a moderate negative semi-partial correlation with the FFMQ-
NR in the multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, including the MW-D in the multiple 
regression allowed for a significant boost in predictive power over the MW-S alone (Sample 1: 
Fchange(1, 713) = 17.79, p < .001, Sample 2: Fchange(1, 759) = 5.81, p = .016). This outcome is 
particularly interesting in that it demonstrates significant yet contradictory relations of the two 
forms of mind wandering with one’s tendency to be non-reactive to inner experiences – with the 
tendency to deliberately mind-wander potentially facilitating this more detached perspective on 
one’s experiences and the tendency to spontaneously mind-wander potentially inhibiting such 
detachment. 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to Non-reactivity to inner 
experience by deliberate mind wandering (MW-D), spontaneous mind wandering (MW-S) 
(Sample 1: N = 716, Sample 2: N = 762) 
 
Dependent variable: Non-reactivity to inner experience 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 
  sr t P sr t p 
        
 MW-D .15 4.22 <.001 .09 2.41 .016 
 MW-S -.28 7.72 <.001 -.21 5.81 <.001 
  
Final Model: R = .28, F(2, 
713) = 28.96, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .21, F(2, 
759) = 17.02, p < .001 
    
 
 
Predicting the Observation/Attending to Sensations Facet. We next conducted a 
multiple regression analysis predicting the Observing and Attending to Sensations, Perceptions, 
Thoughts, and Feelings facet of the FFMQ (FFMQ-O). Here, again, we found significant unique 
semi-partial correlations for each of the MW-D and MW-S when predicting the FFMQ-O, as 
shown in Table 4. In this case, unlike with the FFMQ-NR, both the MW-D and MW-S 
independently positively predict the FFMQ-O, and do so to an equal, albeit small, extent (indeed, 
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the nominally larger of the two relations is flipped between the MW-D and MW-S across 
samples). Also, as was observed with the FFMQ-NR, including the MW-D provided a significant 
boost in predictive power over the MW-S alone (Sample 1: Fchange(1, 713) = 9.65, p = .002, 
Sample 2: Fchange(1, 759) = 5.49, p = .019). Thus, one’s tendency to be more observant of one’s 
sensations, perceptions, thoughts and feelings is associated with an increased tendency to engage 
in both deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering. 
 
Table 4. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to Attending to sensations, 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings by deliberate mind wandering (MW-D), spontaneous mind 
wandering (MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 716, Sample 2: N = 762)  
 
Dependent variable: Observing and attending to sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 
  sr t P sr t p 
        
 MW-D .11 3.11 .002 .08 2.34 .019 
 MW-S .07 2.02 .044 .12 3.32 .001 
  
Final Model: R = .18, F(2, 
713) = 11.38, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .18, F(2, 
759) = 12.18, p < .001 
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Predicting the Acting with Awareness Facet. The relation of one’s tendency to be aware 
of and attentive to one’s body, behaviour, and surroundings with the tendency to engage in 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering has already been reported by Carriere and 
colleagues (2013). In that paper we reported no significant unique contribution of the MW-D 
when predicting the MAAS-LO, the scale which comprises the majority of the items of the 
Acting with Awareness facet of the FFMQ (FFMQ-A). Nonetheless, as the FFMQ-A does 
contain some additional items and therefore may demonstrate a different pattern of relations, we 
conducted a similar multiple regression analysis predicting the FFMQ-A with the MW-D and 
MW-S. As shown in Table 5, we closely replicate the earlier findings, demonstrating no 
significant semi-partial correlation of the MW-D and FFMQ-A when controlling for the MW-S, 
despite again finding a moderate zero-order correlation of the MW-D and FFMQ-A in both 
samples. Likewise, we found the MW-S was a strong predictor of the FFMQ-A, once again 
demonstrating that spontaneous, but not deliberate mind wandering, is strongly associated with 
the tendency to be inattentive and unaware of one’s body, behaviour, and surroundings. 
 
  
 
Table 5. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to Acting with awareness by 
deliberate mind wandering (MW-D), spontaneous mind wandering (MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 716, 
Sample 2: N = 762) 
 
Dependent variable: Acting with awareness 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 
  sr t P sr t p 
        
 MW-D -.01 0.20 .838 -.02 0.80 .424 
 MW-S -.53 17.54 < .001 -.53 17.98 < .001 
  
Final Model: R = .60, F(2, 
713) = 195.45, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .59, F(2, 
759) = 199.20, p < .001 
    
 
Predicting the Describing One’s Feelings Facet. Continuing on with the fourth facet of 
mindfulness assessed by the FFMQ, Describing One’s Feelings, Sensations, and Experience 
(FFMQ-D), we again predicted the FFMQ-D with both the MW-D and MW-S in a multiple 
regression analysis. Shown in Table 6, and similar to the findings with the FFMQ-A, a small-to-
moderate semi-partial correlation was observed with only the MW-S. Thus, it seems only the 
tendency to spontaneously engage in mind wandering is associated with a decreased tendency to 
(internally) describe one’s feelings, sensations, and experiences to oneself. One notable 
difference between the current relations and those observed with the FFMQ-A is that for the 
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MW-D both the semi-partial and zero-order correlations were non-significant in this case, and 
therefore controlling for the MW-S had no practical effect on the outcome of the analysis (in the 
same way, controlling for the MW-D did not change the relation of the FFMQ-D and MW-S). 
 
Table 6. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to Describing one’s feelings, 
sensations, and experience by deliberate mind wandering (MW-D), spontaneous mind wandering 
(MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 716, Sample 2: N = 762) 
 
Dependent variable: Describing one’s feelings, sensations, and experience 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 
  sr t p sr t p 
        
 MW-D .03 0.86 .388 .02 0.69 .488 
 MW-S -.16 4.64 < .001 -.21 6.04 < .001 
  
Final Model: R = .17, F(2, 
713) = 10.80, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .23, F(2, 
759) = 20.23, p < .001 
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Predicting the Non-Judging of Experience Facet. The final facet of mindfulness 
assessed by the FFMQ is Non-Judging of Experience (FFMQ-NJ). A multiple regression analysis 
predicting the FFMQ-NJ with the MW-D and MW-S, shown in Table 7, revealed a familiar 
finding, that only the semi-partial correlation of the MW-S and FFMQ-NJ, controlling for MW-
D, was statistically significant; this finding indicates that spontaneous mind wandering is 
associated with a decreased ability to be non-judgmental of one’s experiences. The pattern of 
findings here is notable in that it closely echoes our observations with the FFMQ-A (having an 
attentive awareness of one’s experiences). In both cases we observed a significant zero-order 
correlation with the MW-D, but did not find a significant semi-partial correlation after 
controlling for the MW-S. 
Table 7. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to Non-judging of experience by 
deliberate mind wandering (MW-D), spontaneous mind wandering (MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 716, 
Sample 2: N = 762) 
Dependent variable: Non-judging of experience 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 
  sr t p sr t p 
        
 MW-D -.03 0.77 .441 .03 0.90 .367 
 MW-S .32 9.39 < .001 .29 8.36 < .001 
  
Final Model: R = .36, F(2, 
713) = 51.65, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .33, F(2, 
759) = 45.54, p < .001 
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Correlations with Combined MW-S and MW-D 
In recent work, Mrazek et al. (2013) developed and validated a trait-level scale of mind 
wandering (the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire; MWQ) that was intended to index the frequency 
of mind wandering “irrespective of whether mind-wandering is deliberate or spontaneous” (p. 2). 
One important question to ask when considering the aforementioned analyses is what would 
happen if, rather than separate deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, a researcher were to 
combine the two into one “overall” measure of mind wandering, thus treating mind wandering as 
a unitary construct. To shed some light on this question, we calculated the average of the 
combined reports of both spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering for each participant and 
correlated these overall reports of mind wandering with the five facets of the FFMQ. The 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for overall mind wandering and all five facets 
of the FFMQ are presented in Table 8. As can be seen in Table 8, all of the facets of the FFMQ 
were significantly correlated with overall mind wandering. Of particular importance, however, is 
the negative correlation of overall mind wandering and the FFMQ-NR facet. The reason that this 
is noteworthy is because when conflating deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, we miss 
out on the details surrounding MW-D’s association with non-reactivity (FFMQ-NR); indeed, 
recall that the MW-D was found to be significantly positively associated with the FFMQ-NR 
after controlling for the MW-S, whereas the combined measure of mind wandering demonstrates 
a negative relation with the FFMQ-NR. Thus, this practice of conflating deliberate and 
spontaneous mind wandering would result in limited conclusions about the relation of mind 
wandering and non-reactivity to inner experiences, and would completely mask the real 
underlying associations of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering with non-reactivity. 
  
 
Table 8. Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients of FFMQ Measures with Overall Mind 
Wandering (combining MW-D and MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 716, Sample 2: N = 762) 
 
 
Non-
reactivity 
Observing Awareness Describing  Non-judging 
      
Overall Mind Wandering (Sample 1) -.12**  .18*** -.51***     -.13** .29*** 
Overall Mind Wandering (Sample 2) -.11** .18*** -.50***  -.17*** .29*** 
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, 2-tailed 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that (1) deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering 
are dissociable and (2) conflating deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering might lead to 
underspecified and sometimes even false conclusions. Critically, we observed that, whereas 
spontaneous mind wandering was uniquely and negatively associated with difficulty taking a 
non-reactive stance toward internal experience (i.e., the FFMQ-NR), deliberate mind wandering 
was uniquely and positively associated with the same trait. We also observed that both 
spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering uniquely predicted an increased propensity to 
observe and/or attend to one’s sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (the FFMQ-O). In 
addition, and perhaps most importantly, we showed that the correlation of “overall” (conflated) 
mind wandering with the FFMQ-NR was negative, even though deliberate mind wandering was, 
on its own, shown to positively correlate with this variable. Thus, on the basis of the overall 
correlation alone, one would be led to draw limited conclusions about the relation of mind 
wandering and non-reactivity. In fact, in smaller (more typical) samples, one might not even be 
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able to detect a relation of overall mind wandering and non-reactivity (or some variable of 
interest) because deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering might be oppositely associated 
with the variable of interest, and their combination will dampen the overall correlation.  
To date, numerous researchers of mind wandering (including ourselves) have inferred 
that reports of mind wandering are reflective of 1) unintentional shifts in thought away from a 
focal task and/or 2) failures of executive control (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010; McVay & Kane, 2010; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; but 
see Smallwood, 2013). One necessary assumption underlying this view is that individuals who 
are high in trait-level mind wandering engage in mind wandering because they cannot stop 
themselves from doing so. However, based on the present results, we suggest that trait-level 
reports of mind wandering might not exclusively capture spontaneous, unintentional thoughts, 
but might instead also include those that are deliberate. Thus, we suggest that if researchers seek 
to examine and understand the role of unintentional, spontaneous mind wandering, then it is 
paramount that they dissociate spontaneous from deliberate mind wandering. 
In treating mind wandering as a non-uniform experience that can differ in terms of 
intentionality, the present work is consistent with and extends upon other work that has 
construed mind wandering as a heterogeneous – rather than a homogeneous – construct 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). In their recent article, Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna 
highlighted some of the contradictory findings in the extant literature on mind wandering. They 
then moved on to argue that these contradictions have arisen because there are multiple types of 
mind wandering that vary on the basis of their content, and that these different types of mind 
wandering might have their own unique consequences and associates. As an example of one such 
contradiction, they point to the fact that, whereas some research has argued that mind wandering 
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is a detrimental state associated with negative outcomes such as depression and unhappiness 
(e.g., Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), other work has shown that mind wandering can, at times, 
be conceived of a beneficial state, as it has been associated with positive outcomes such as 
increased creativity (Baird et al. 2012) and increases in one’s propensity to plan future events 
(Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). According to Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, the 
foregoing contradiction likely resulted because researchers have focused on different types of 
mind wandering without constraining their interpretations to the specific type under 
investigation. For instance, it is possible that mind wandering that involves positively-valenced 
content might be associated with beneficial outcomes, whereas mind wandering that involves 
negatively-valenced content might be associated with detrimental outcomes. If, however, 
researchers do not distinguish between these different types of mind wandering then it is 
inevitable that contradictions will arise because these different types of mind wandering will 
share different associates.  
While Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) argue that distinguishing between types of 
mind wandering on the basis of content might resolve contradictions in the literature, it also 
seems likely that distinguishing between spontaneous and deliberate types of mind wandering 
might likewise resolve some contradictions. Whereas Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna suggest 
that mind wandering episodes might differ in content, our additional suggestion is that episodes 
of mind wandering might differ in terms of process (relating to spontaneous versus deliberate 
mechanisms). Indeed, episodes of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering might, at times, 
both consist of identical trains of thought (i.e., the content can be exactly the same), but these 
types of mind wandering would nevertheless be distinct in that one would be engaged with 
intention, and the other without intention. For example, as noted in the previous paragraph, mind 
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wandering has been referred to both as a beneficial state (e.g., it is associated with future 
planning; Baird et al., 2011) and detrimental state (e.g., it can be a cause of unhappiness; 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). When considering this apparent contradiction, it is plausible that 
future planning might be associated with deliberate, controlled mind wandering, whereas 
unhappiness might be the result of ruminative, unwanted mind wandering that occurs 
spontaneously. In this case, what might appear to be a contradiction would merely be the result 
of different types of mind wandering – each of which involves distinct cognitive processes – 
yielding different outcomes.  
The present findings are also relevant to studies showing that people can exhibit some 
degree of control over their levels of mind wandering (see Bernhardt, Smallwood et al., 2014; 
Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2011; Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013; Thomson, Besner 
& Smilek, 2013). For instance, Thomson et al. (2013) showed that people more frequently mind-
wander during easier congruent Stroop trials than during harder incongruent Stroop trials, and 
that, in both cases, people are able to effectively adjust their levels of mind wandering to prevent 
any noticeable costs on performance. Based on these results, Thomson et al. posited that, as task 
difficulty varies, people are able to adjust their level of mind wandering, which thereby allows 
them to optimize both their performance on the task as well as their level of mind wandering (for 
a similar suggestion, see also Levinson et al., 2011). Given that, by definition, deliberate mind 
wandering is under one’s control, whereas spontaneous mind wandering is not under one’s 
control, the present findings suggest that in the abovementioned studies, the manner in which 
people might be adjusting their levels of mind wandering is by specifically regulating their levels 
of deliberate (as opposed to spontaneous) mind wandering.  
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Although here we explored the unique contributions of deliberate and spontaneous mind 
wandering at a trait level, it will be important for future research to examine these types of mind 
wandering at a state level, as participants are completing a given task (see Shaw & Giambra, 
1993), where there is also the possibility that experiences of mind wandering might be 
spontaneous and deliberate. An implicit assumption made by numerous researchers studying 
mind wandering is that their participants are motivated to perform well on the tasks that they are 
given in the laboratory and that they do their best to refrain from engaging in task-unrelated 
thought. However, because research on mind wandering often involves exceptionally 
monotonous and boring tasks, it might very well be the case that many participants seek to 
“escape” the task and to alleviate boredom by deliberately engaging in mind wandering. If this is 
in fact the case, then this will pose a serious problem for researchers; indeed, it may be the case 
that the majority of research purported to examine unintentional, spontaneous shifts in attention 
has in fact been inadvertently examining the mental behaviour of the unmotivated, deliberately 
mind-wandering participant. We therefore believe that our deliberate and spontaneous mind-
wandering scales, as well as their state-level counterparts, will prove to be important tools for 
elucidating the nature of mind wandering both in laboratory and real-world settings. 
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Study 2: 
 
The following work has been published in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (Seli, Smallwood, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015). 
 
Mind wandering seems to be a prototypical feature of attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD). However, an important emerging distinction of mind-wandering types hinges 
on whether a given episode of mind wandering reflects a failure of executive control 
(spontaneous mind wandering) or the engagement of controlled processes for internal processing 
(deliberate mind wandering). Here we distinguish between spontaneous and deliberate mind 
wandering and test the hypothesis that symptoms of ADHD are associated with the former but 
not the latter. We assessed ADHD symptomatology and everyday levels of deliberate and 
spontaneous mind wandering in two large non-clinical samples (Ns =1,354). In addition, to 
provide converging evidence, we examined rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering 
in a clinically-diagnosed ADHD sample. Results provide clear evidence that spontaneous, but 
not deliberate, mind wandering is a central feature of ADHD symptomatology at both the clinical 
and non-clinical level. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both 
ADHD and mind wandering. 
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Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a neurobehavioral disorder 
characterized by inattention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity (Barkley, 1997; Douglas, 1983; 
Hinshaw, 1994). Of all the behavioural disorders of childhood, ADHD is the most commonly 
diagnosed, with a strikingly high prevalence rate of 5-10% (Polancyzk & Rohde, 2007). 
Although ADHD has long been thought to be a disorder of childhood, a growing body of 
research has shown that ADHD impairments can persist into adulthood (Barkley, Fischer, 
Edelbrock, & Smallish, 1990; Mannuzza et al., 2011), with an estimated adult-ADHD prevalence 
rate of 4.4% (Kessler et al., 2006). Given that ADHD is associated with problems of attention 
and concentration, it is perhaps not surprising to learn that it has been linked to a host of 
impairments, including problems with (1) executive control (Nigg, Butler, & Huang-Pollock, 
2002), (2) academic performance (e.g., DeShazo, Lyman, & Klinger, 2002; Fergusson & 
Horwood, 1995; Hinshaw, 1992), (3) familial and martial relationships (e.g., Johnston et al., 
2012), (4) occupational functioning (Barkley & Fischer, 2011), and (5) sustained attention 
(Barkley, 1997), to name a few. Thus, understanding ADHD, as well as its causes and 
consequences, has been an important focal point for many clinical researchers over the past few 
decades.  
In a contemporary independent line of research, there has been an increasing amount of 
work examining the construct of mind wandering, which is often defined as the unintentional 
shifting of attention toward internal thoughts (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood et 
al., 2007). Reminiscent of certain ADHD symptoms, mind wandering involves distraction by 
internal thought and inattention to focal tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and has been 
associated with (1) impulsivity (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009), (2) poor sustained 
attention (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013), and (3) 
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hyperactive behaviour (i.e., fidgeting; Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013), all of which are key 
characteristics of ADHD. Moreover, like ADHD, mind wandering has been linked to (1) poor 
academic performance (Risko et al., 2012; Szpunar, Khan, and Schacter, 2013), (2) elevated 
response variability (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013), (3) failures of 
executive control (Kane et al., 2007), and (4) difficulties in the workplace (Knowles & Tay, 
2002). While these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that mind wandering is a central 
feature of ADHD, research on these two topics has progressed relatively independently over the 
years and, to date, there have been few studies examining the role of mind wandering in the 
larger symptomatology of ADHD (Shaw & Giambra, 1993; Franklin et al., in press).  
Although the aforementioned evidence and argument provide grounds to hypothesize that 
mind wandering is a central feature of ADHD, counterarguments are provided by recent research 
that has reported that at least some aspects of mind wandering are linked to patience 
(Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013), controlled processing (Gorgolewski et al., 2014), and 
premeditation (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009), all of which are often thought to be 
antithetical to ADHD characteristics. Moreover, mind wandering has been linked to a reduction 
in external distraction (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011), whereas ADHD is thought to 
be associated with greater distraction from external sources (Barkley, Koplowitz, Anderson, & 
McMurray, 1997).  
Given the foregoing, one important question to ask is: why might it be the case that some 
correlates of mind wandering are consistent with ADHD symptomatology, whereas others are 
not? In answering this question, it is important to note that “mind wandering” is an umbrella 
term for the myriad mental experiences that people have that are not directly related to the 
external environment or focal tasks. Indeed, Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) have argued 
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that mind wandering is a heterogeneous experience and that the functional outcomes associated 
with the experience will depend in part on features of particular episodes, such as content (see 
also Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press). To date, there is evidence that mind wandering can vary 
on a number of dimensions including its: (1) temporal nature (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 
2009), (2) topical stability (Ottaviani, Shapiro, & Couyoumdjian, 2013), (3) valence (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013), (4) depth of decoupling (Seli, Carriere, Thomson, et al., 
2014; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008), (5) level of awareness (Schooler, 2002; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007), and (6) intentionality (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 
2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press). Given the heterogeneous nature of mind wandering 
episodes, along with the hypothesis that different dimensions of mind wandering will be 
associated with different functional outcomes (Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press; Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a less than perfect correspondence 
between the experience of “mind wandering,” defined broadly, and the notion of distracted 
inattention in ADHD.   
Of the aforementioned dimensions of mind wandering, one that is particularly relevant to 
the relation of mind wandering and ADHD symptoms is whether the mind wandering in question 
is deliberate or spontaneous. Research has shown that mind wandering can occur deliberately, 
with intention, or spontaneously, without intention (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Giambra, 
1989; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press; Shaw & Giambra, 1993). Importantly, it is the 
spontaneous, unintentional shifting of attention that seems closely relevant to ADHD 
symptomatology given that such experiences seem to reflect difficulties in controlled processing, 
problems with inhibiting distracting information, and unintentional task inattention (Carriere et 
al., 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press; Seli, Carriere, Xu, et al., under review). Deliberate, 
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intentional shifts, on the other hand, seem not to reflect problems in inhibiting distracting 
information, but instead reflect the willing engagement of thought, which is perhaps indicative of 
controlled processing (Carriere et al., 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press; Seli, Carriere, Xu, 
et al., under review). Thus, considering these subtypes of mind wandering in the context of 
ADHD, a more nuanced hypothesis is that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is 
associated with ADHD.  
The hypothesis that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is associated with 
ADHD is supported by a study conducted by Shaw and Giambra (1993), in which the authors 
examined the frequency of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering in three groups: (1) 
college students who self-reported that they had been diagnosed with ADHD during childhood, 
(2) a non-clinical group of students who were not previously labeled as having ADHD, but who 
scored in the top 10 percent on a questionnaire-based measure of ADHD (i.e., the Characteristics 
Rating-Child questionnaire; CR-C), and (3) a non-clinical group of students who were also not 
clinically labeled as having ADHD, and who scored in the bottom 10 percent on the CR-C. 
Participants completed a simple vigilance task for which they were instructed to make responses 
(button presses) to frequently presented small xs and to withhold responses to infrequently 
presented large Xs. Throughout the task, participants were intermittently presented thought 
probes that asked them to report whether, at any point since the previous probe, they had 
engaged in mind wandering, and if so, whether it was engaged spontaneously (without intention) 
or deliberately (with intention). The results showed that participants who were diagnosed with 
ADHD reported more spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering relative to the other two 
groups. Moreover, participants in the non-clinical group reported more spontaneous, but not 
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deliberate, mind wandering than the group with no prior history of ADHD and scoring low on 
the measures of ADHD symptoms. 
Although Shaw and Giambra’s (1993) findings provide initial evidence for the hypothesis 
that ADHD is associated with spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering, there are several 
important limitations of their study. First, they had relatively small sample sizes in each of their 
conditions (e.g., 13 participants in the ADHD condition). Second, Shaw and Giambra 
exclusively examined mind wandering occurring in the context of a boring vigilance task, which 
may not readily generalize to everyday scenarios in which the tasks people perform are, on the 
whole, arguably less boring. Third, Shaw and Giambra did not assess the potential independent 
(or unique) contributions of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in predicting ADHD. 
Although not discussed in detail in their article, the mind-wandering data that Shaw and Giambra 
collected were ipsative in nature; that is, in cases where participants’ reported mind wandering, 
they were forced to indicate that their mind wandering was either spontaneous or deliberate (i.e., 
a “forced-choice” scale was used). As a result, there was a structurally-forced negative 
correlation between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering, which precluded analyses 
examining the independent contributions of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering.  
The Present Study 
Building on Shaw and Giambra’s (1993) seminal work, in the present study we assessed 
ADHD symptomatology and trait-level mind-wandering propensity (both deliberate and 
spontaneous) in two very large non-clinical samples (Ns =1,354). This design allowed us to 
extend Shaw and Giambra’s study in the following three ways. First, it allowed for greater power 
to detect stable effects while also allowing for the possibility of replication across independent 
samples. Second, it allowed us to assess everyday tendencies to engage in both deliberate and 
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spontaneous mind wandering (i.e., mind wandering at the trait level) to determine whether the 
previously observed relation of spontaneous mind wandering and ADHD symptoms generalizes 
to everyday experiences of mind wandering. Third, it provided us the opportunity to explore the 
possibility that spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering might independently predict ADHD 
symptoms. To this end, we conducted a large survey study in which undergraduate psychology 
students completed online questionnaires assessing (1) trait levels of deliberate mind wandering 
(assessed with the Mind Wandering: Deliberate scale; MW:D; Carriere et al., 2013), (2) trait 
levels of spontaneous mind wandering (assessed with the Mind Wandering: Spontaneous scale; 
MW:S; Carriere et al., 2013), and (3) ADHD symptomatology (assessed with the short-form 
screener of the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale v1.1; ASRS).  
In addition to assessing non-clinical ADHD symptomatology via the ASRS screener, we 
also asked participants to report whether they had ever been clinically diagnosed with ADHD. Of 
all of the participants, 69 reported previous diagnoses. Thus, we also examined trait-level mind 
wandering propensity in this clinical group of individuals, seeking to determine whether they too 
reported higher levels of spontaneous (but not deliberate) mind wandering relative to a control 
sample matched on age and sex.  
Study 2 Method 
 Participants 
To allow for replication of our findings, we analyzed data from two separate non-clinical 
samples of undergraduate psychology students at the University of Waterloo. Each of the two 
samples consisted of 1,354 participants (mean age was 22.44 and 22.41 years for samples 1 and 
2, respectively, with 985 females in sample 1, and 917 females in sample 2), all of whom 
completed every item of each questionnaire included in the study. Also included among the 
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scales of interest (i.e., Mind Wandering: Spontaneous (MW-S), Mind Wandering: Deliberate 
(MW-D), and the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale v1.1; ASRS) were various other 
questionnaires that were of interest to other researchers, but that were not analyzed for the 
present study. Collectively, these questionnaires were given to participants in the first month of 
classes, and the order of presentation of the questionnaires was randomized across participants. 
Participants were therefore unaware of the relatedness of our scales. Participants received partial 
course credit for completing the questionnaires. 
As noted above, of the 2,708 participants who completed our study, we identified a group 
of 69 individuals who reported that they had, at some point in their past, been clinically 
diagnosed with ADHD (mean age was 21.38, with 44 females; hereafter referred to as the 
Clinical ADHD Sample). For purposes of comparison, we created a group of 69 control 
participants (who had not been diagnosed with ADHD) matched on age and sex. This procedure 
was conducted on a case-by-case basis whereby each of the 69 participants in the Clinical 
ADHD sample was randomly paired with a control participant (i.e., one of the 2,639 participants 
who did not report having been clinically diagnosed with ADHD) of the same age and sex.  
Measures 
Deliberate and Spontaneous Mind Wandering. We used the 4-item Mind Wandering: 
Deliberate (MW-D) scale and the 4-item Mind Wandering: Spontaneous (MW-S) scale to index 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, respectively (Carriere et al., 2013). The MW-D 
includes items that are related to intentional mind wandering, such as: “I allow my thoughts to 
wander on purpose,” whereas the MW-S includes items that are related to unintentional mind 
wandering, such as: “I find my thoughts wandering spontaneously.” Both scales are scored using 
a seven-point Likert scale.  
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The Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale v1.1. We measured ADHD symptoms using the 
short-form screener of the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale v1.1 (ASRS), which consists of a 
checklist of six symptoms that, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth edition (DSM-IV), correspond to the presentation of ADHD symptoms in 
adults (Adler et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2005). Each symptom in the screener includes a five-
point Likert scale with possible responses ranging from 0 (Never) to 4 (Very Often). Whereas the 
complete ASRS scale consists of a checklist of 18 symptoms, scores on the six symptoms found 
in short-form screener of the ASRS can be used as a diagnostic screening criterion for ADHD 
(Krause et al., 2006), and previous research has noted that this screener outperforms the full 
ASRS, therefore making it more preferable than the full 18-item scale (Kessler et al., 2005).  
Traditionally, to assess ADHD symptomatology via the ASRS screener, participants’ 
ratings on each of the six symptoms are used to determine whether the symptom described is 
present or absent (i.e., each symptom is treated as existing on a dichotomous scale). For example, 
the first item of the ASRS screener is “How often do you have trouble wrapping up the final 
details of a project once the challenging parts have been done?” To this item, participants can 
respond:  “Never,” “Rarely,” “Sometimes,” “Often,” or “Very Often.” In the case of this 
particular item, a response of “Sometimes,” “Often,” or “Very Often” indicates the presence of 
that symptom, whereas responses of, “Rarely” and “Never” indicates the absence of that 
symptom. According to the ASRS instructions, participants who present with 4 or more of the 
symptoms are at risk of ADHD and should consider taking part in a follow-up assessment with a 
clinician.  
Although, as noted, the dichotomous-scoring method is traditionally used when assessing 
ASRS responses, some researchers have recently argued for the utility of assessing ADHD 
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symptoms along a continuum, rather than dichotomously (Overbey, Snell, and Callis, 2011; 
Whalen et al., 2003). In the case of the ASRS screener, this can be achieved by simply averaging 
each participant’s responses to the symptoms presented in the checklist.   
In the present study, we assessed ADHD symptoms using both of the aforementioned 
scoring methods to demonstrate that our findings are not dependent on the method of scoring 
used. Importantly, we find that the results are consistent across these two scoring methods. Thus, 
for the sake of both clarity and brevity, below we report only the results of the continuous-
scoring method.  
Study 2 Results 
 In the section that follows, we begin by examining the relations of mind wandering (both 
deliberate and spontaneous) and ADHD in our two Non-Clinical samples. Following these 
analyses, we examine these relations in our Clinical ADHD sample, seeking to determine 
whether the results are consistent across the different samples.   
Non-Clinical Samples 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations. We first examined the descriptive statistics for 
the MW-D, MW-S, and the ASRS in our two Non-Clinical samples. The mean scores on the 
MW-D (Sample 1: M =4.43, SD = 1.44; Sample 2: M = 4.57, SD = 1.44), MW-S (Sample 1: M 
=4.23, SD = 1.47; Sample 2: M = 4.32, SD = 1.37), and ASRS (Sample 1: M =1.81, SD = 0.65; 
Sample 2: M = 1.94, SD = 0.62) all showed good consistency across both samples. Next, we 
examined the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for all measures. As has been 
shown in previous studies (Carriere et al., 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, in press), the MW-D 
and MW-S were moderately positively correlated across our two samples, r = .39 (Sample 1) and 
r = .40 (Sample 2; both ps < .001). Additionally, and consistent across both samples, we 
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observed a positive relation of both the MW-D and ASRS, r = .23 (Sample 1) and r = .25 
(Sample 2; both ps < .001), and the MW-S and ASRS, r = .52 (Sample 1) and r = .47 (Sample 2; 
both ps < .001), indicating that individuals showing greater levels of ADHD symptoms 
experience higher levels of both deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering.  
Regression Analyses. Given that the MW-D and MW-S were moderately correlated with 
one another across our two samples, we next sought to determine their unique contributions to 
ASRS scores. Thus, for each sample, we conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting 
ASRS with the MW-D and MW-S (see Table 9). In both samples, the MW-S regression 
coefficients were significant and relatively large, and the semi-partial correlations with the ASRS 
appeared to be strikingly linear (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the semi-partial correlation of 
MW-D and ASRS was non-significant in Sample 1 (Fchange(1, 1,351) =  1.833, p = .176), 
although in Sample 2 its inclusion in the multiple regression analysis did result in a significant, if 
modest, boost in predictive power over the MW-S alone (Fchange(1, 1,351) =  7.658, p < .006) 
(see Figure 1). It is, however, worth noting that in Sample 2, the inclusion of the MW-D only 
accounted for an R
2
change of .004, and that this considerably small increase in predictive power 
was significant only because of the very large sample. Thus, the results of the regression 
analyses indicate that, whereas spontaneous mind wandering is strongly independently related to 
ADHD symptoms, deliberate mind wandering is, at best, very weakly associated with such 
symptoms.   
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Table 9. Multiple regression testing for unique contributions to ASRS by deliberate mind 
wandering (MW-D) and spontaneous mind wandering (MW-S) (Sample 1: N = 1,354, Sample 2: 
N = 1,353) 
 
Dependent variable: ASRS 
  Sample 1       Sample 2 
  sr t p sr t p 
        
 MW-D .03 1.35 .176 .07 2.77 .006 
 MW-S .47 19.93 <.001 .40 16.61 <.001 
  
Final Model: R = .52, F(2, 1351) 
= 250.01, p < .001 
 
Final Model: R = .47, F(2, 1351) 
= 191.57, p < .001 
    
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplots showing the unique relations of the MW-S (top row) and MW-D (bottom 
row) with the ASRS, for samples 1 (left column) and 2 (right column).  
 42 
 
Clinical Sample 
 
Having demonstrated that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering was 
consistently and uniquely associated with ADHD symptomatology in two large Non-Clinical 
samples, we next sought to determine whether this same pattern of results would emerge when 
comparing mind-wandering rates across a clinical ADHD group of participants and a control 
group of Non-Clinical participants who were matched on age and sex. 
Deliberate and Spontaneous Mind Wandering. Mean reports of deliberate and 
spontaneous mind wandering for each Sample (Clinical and Non-Clinical) are presented in 
Figure 2. To determine whether reports of these two types of mind wandering differed across 
the two samples, we conducted a 2 by 2 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with Sample 
as the between-subjects factor and Mind-Wandering Type (Deliberate vs. Spontaneous) as the 
within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of Mind-Wandering Type, 
F(1, 136) = 5.22, MSE = 1.37, ηp
2 
= .04, p =.024, but a non-significant effect of Sample, F(1, 
136) = 2.35, MSE = 3.05, ηp
2 
= .02, p =.127. There was, however, a significant interaction, F(1, 
136) = 9.49, MSE = 1.37, ηp
2 
= .07, p =.002. Given that the MW-S and MW-D were again 
found to be moderately correlated across each of our samples (r = .25 and r = .50 for the 
Clinical and Non-Clinical samples, respectively), we followed-up on this interaction by 
conducting two separate Univariate Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) in which we 
examined the rates of each of the two types of mind wandering across our two samples while 
statistically controlling for the influence of other type of mind wandering. First, we examined 
rates of spontaneous mind wandering across our two samples while controlling for the 
influence of deliberate mind wandering. Thus, Spontaneous Mind Wandering was entered as 
the dependent variable, Sample as the fixed factor, and Deliberate Mind Wandering as a 
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covariate. The analysis yielded a significant effect of Deliberate Mind Wandering, F(1, 135) = 
22.63, MSE = 1.86, ηp
2 
= .14, p < .001. Moreover, there was a significant effect of Sample, F(1, 
135) = 11.80, MSE = 1.86, ηp
2 
= .08, p = .001, indicating that, when controlling for Deliberate 
Mind Wandering, individuals in the Clinical sample still showed significantly higher levels of 
Spontaneous Mind Wandering (M = 5.13) than those in the Non-Clinical sample (M = 4.33). 
Next, we examined rates of Deliberate Mind Wandering across our two samples while 
statistically controlling for the influence of Spontaneous Mind Wandering. Here, Deliberate 
Mind Wandering was entered as the dependent variable, Sample as the fixed factor, and 
Spontaneous Mind Wandering as the covariate. Results revealed a non-significant effect of 
Sample, F(1, 135) = 2.73, MSE = 1.95, ηp
2 
= .02, p = .101, indicating that rates of Deliberate 
Mind Wandering were equivalent across the Clinical sample (M = 4.20) and Non-Clinical 
sample (M = 4.61), even when controlling for the influence of Spontaneous Mind Wandering. 
Importantly, these findings are consistent with those obtained when examining mind-
wandering rates and ADHD symptomatology in our two large Non-Clinical samples, and thus 
provide further evidence to support the claim that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind 
wandering is a central feature of ADHD symptomatology.  
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Figure 2. Mean levels of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering for the Clinical and Non-
Clinical samples. Error bars are one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
 
 The results of the present study are consistent with Shaw and Giambra’s (1993) finding 
that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is associated with ADHD symptoms. 
Critically, given that (1) our results replicated across two very large samples, (2) similar results 
were observed irrespective of which scoring system was used for the ASRS, and (3) results 
were consistent across clinical and non-clinical populations, the present study clearly 
demonstrates the robustness of this important theoretical relation, and in doing so circumvents 
recent concerns regarding the reliability of psychological research (e.g., Pashler & 
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Wagenmakers, 2012). In addition, our results extend Shaw and Giambra’s work providing 
evidence that: (1) the observed relation of spontaneous mind wandering and ADHD symptoms 
holds when examining spontaneous mind wandering as reported for everyday settings (i.e., at 
the trait level), (2) this remains the case when statistically controlling for levels of deliberate 
mind wandering, and (3) the relation of spontaneous mind wandering and ADHD symptoms is 
strikingly linear, suggesting that indexing ADHD symptoms along a continuum, rather than as 
a dichotomous split, might provide a more sensitive measure of the associates of ADHD, as 
has been recently proposed (Overbey, et al., 2011).  
In addition to the foregoing, the results of the present study indicate that, in considering 
possible methods of intervention for ADHD, it will be important for researchers to specifically 
focus on identifying ways to reduce unintentional, spontaneous shifts in attention, rather than 
broadly-measured “inattention,” which includes the experience of deliberate disengagement 
with the external environment. Indeed, given that deliberate mind wandering was found to be, 
at best, very weakly associated with ADHD symptoms (although inconsistently across our two 
samples), a focus on reducing unwanted, unintentional, and spontaneous mind wandering 
seems to be warranted in future investigations.  
The present results appear to overlap in interesting ways with recent work by Franklin 
et al. (in press), who observed a positive relation of probe-caught mind wandering and ADHD 
symptomatology in an adult sample. One particularly intriguing finding from their study was 
that participants who reported high levels of ADHD were also more likely to report a lack of 
awareness of their mind wandering as it occurred. In linking Franklin et al.’s work to the 
present findings, it seems a plausible hypothesis that spontaneous, uncontrolled mind 
wandering is more likely to occur in the absence of awareness than deliberate mind wandering. 
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Of course, awareness and control need not completely overlap with one another in that it is 
theoretically possible that an individual can, for example, engage in spontaneous mind 
wandering while being completely aware of the fact that (s)he is mind wandering. On the one 
hand, then, these results suggest the possibility that it is a lack of control over one’s mind 
wandering that is the critical factor involved in explaining the sometimes detrimental 
consequences of this form of internal distraction. On the other hand, however, it is possible that 
the critical factor is not one’s level of control over mind wandering, but is instead one’s level of 
awareness of mind wandering. Alternatively, perhaps ADHD is specifically associated with 
mind wandering that is characterized both by a lack of control and a lack of awareness. 
Critically, what this suggests is that the frequency at which one engages in overall mind 
wandering may not be the key factor involved in producing attention-related deficits, but that 
instead control over, and/or awareness of, mind wandering may be important.  
    While the results of our study have important implications for researchers interested 
in studying ADHD symptomatology, more generally, our observed association of spontaneous 
mind wandering and ADHD provides evidence in support of the recently proposed view that it 
is inappropriate to treat mind wandering as a, unitary, or homogeneous experience (e.g., Seli, 
Carriere, & Smilek, in press; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). While initial empirical and 
theoretical work has treated mind wandering as a homogeneous state, recent work has 
established that different experiential categories (or dimensions) of mind wandering can be 
identified. For instance, as noted in the Introduction, some recently identified dimensions of 
mind wandering include its temporal focus (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009), level of 
awareness (Schooler, 2002), and valence (Ruby et al., 2013), to name a few. In each case, these 
dimensions have been shown to predict unique variance in independent outcomes such as 
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neural activity (Gorgolewski et al., 2014), mood (Ruby et al., 2013), and, in the present case, 
ADHD symptoms. Thus, the acknowledgment of a multiplicity of states within the construct of 
mind wandering might well explain one of the fundamental paradoxes of mind wandering: 
namely, that for some individuals, mind wandering is a source of unhappiness and error 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2009; respectively), and for others, a source 
of creativity and constructive thought (Baird et al., 2012; Kaufman & Singer, 2011). 
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that one limitation of the present findings is 
that we indexed participants’ subjective reports of trait-level mind wandering and ADHD 
symptomatology, and that other measures might lead to different findings than those observed 
here. However, with respect to our measure of mind wandering, we note that previous studies 
(Franklin et al., in press; Shaw & Giambra, 1993) have already shown that ADHD is associated 
with probe-caught mind wandering, suggesting some degree of generality of the present 
findings. Furthermore, with respect to our measure of ADHD, we note that we not only 
collected participants’ subjective reports using a standard clinical tool (i.e., the ASRS), but we 
also asked them whether they have received a clinical diagnosis of ADHD. The fact that we 
obtained participants’ reports about their clinical diagnoses goes some way toward allaying the 
concern that our results are simply attributable to the particular measures employed in the 
present study. While replication of the present findings with various measures will be useful, 
our results present good evidence to suggest a link between trait-level spontaneous mind 
wandering and ADHD, and should therefore provide fruitful ground for future research on the 
topic. 
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 Having demonstrated that trait-level  deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering are 
dissociable experiences that sometimes differentially relate to critical variables of interest, I 
next moved on to examine state-level deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering, seeking to 
determine whether these in-the-moment experiences are likewise dissociable, and whether 
there is practical utility in distinguishing between these two types of cognitive experiences 
(i.e., whether they are differentially associated with certain variables of interest).  
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Study 3 
 
The following work has been published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition (Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015). 
 Researchers of mind wandering frequently assume that (1) participants are motivated to 
do well on the tasks they are given, and (2) task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) that occur during 
task performance reflect unintentional, unwanted thoughts that occur despite participants’ best 
intentions to maintain task-focus. Given the relatively boring and tedious nature of most mind-
wandering tasks, however, there is the possibility that some participants have little motivation 
to do well on such tasks, and that this lack of motivation might in turn result in increases 
specifically in intentional TUTs. In the present study, we explored these possibilities, finding 
that individuals reporting lower motivation to perform well on a sustained-attention task 
reported more intentional relative to unintentional TUTs compared to individuals reporting 
higher motivation. Interestingly, our results indicate that the extent to which participants 
engage in intentional versus unintentional TUTs does not differentially relate to performance: 
both types of off-task thought were found to be equally associated with performance 
decrements. Participants with low levels of task-motivation also engaged in more overall 
TUTs, however, and this increase in TUTs was associated with greater performance 
decrements. We discuss these findings in the context of the literature on mind wandering, 
highlighting the importance of assessing the intentionality of TUTs and motivation to perform 
well on tasks assessing mind wandering. 
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A basic assumption underlying human psychological research is that most participants 
are at least moderately motivated to perform acceptably on laboratory tasks. Indeed, there is a 
tradition of concern in psychology that participants may often be overly motivated to perform 
well on laboratory tasks, at least in the sense of producing desirable results for the researcher 
(i.e., demand characteristics; e.g., Orne, 2009; Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 1973). It is thus 
standard procedure in psychological research to attempt to conceal the underlying hypothesis 
from participants lest they, in their zeal to be ‘good’ participants, produce false positives. 
Somewhat less concern and systematic analysis has been evident regarding unmotivated, 
malingering participants, though some (e.g., Webster & Sell, 2007) have expressed concerns 
regarding low levels of motivation in participants, particularly when participation is associated 
with course credit. Researchers sometimes try to address such concerns by attempting to 
induce extrinsic motivation through monetary incentives (for a review see Deci, Koestner, & 
Ryan, 1999), though these are often sufficiently modest as to arguably induce reactance rather 
than motivation. Other studies attempt to assess the level of motivation by directly asking 
participants about their motivation to be attentive, do well, conform to instructions, and the like 
(e.g., Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). This latter point is of particular importance as laboratory 
tasks vary in their intrinsic interest as well as their apparent pragmatic relevance to the “real 
world,” or to the participants themselves. It is thus a reasonable assumption that participants 
will vary in their judgment of the deep importance or utter triviality of the study of many 
psychological processes, and that this, in turn, will be associated with varying levels of 
motivation.  
Although the concern that participants might exhibit very different levels of motivation 
during laboratory tasks is arguably important for most (if not all) studies of human psychology, 
 51 
 
one area of psychological research in which this concern is particularly relevant is the study of 
mind wandering. Mind wandering has been commonly conceptualized as task-unrelated 
thoughts (i.e. TUTs) that often occur spontaneously, without intention (e.g., Baars, 2010; 
Carciofo, Du, Song, & Zhang, 2014; He, Becic, Lee, & McCarley, 2011; Klinger, 2009; Kane 
& McVay, 2013; Mason et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2010; O’Callaghan, Shine, Lewis, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood, O’Connor, 
Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). Importantly, the assumption that TUTs 
reported in laboratory studies often occur without intention is conceptually critical as research 
on mind wandering is itself often motivated by an interest in the occurrence of TUTs that are 
beyond the control of participants; that is, TUTs that occur despite participants’ best efforts to 
remain engaged with their task (e.g., He et al., 2011; Kane & McVay, 2013; McVay & Kane, 
2010; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).  
However, that at least some of the TUTs occurring during laboratory tasks are 
deliberate or intentional (rather than spontaneous/unintentional) has been previously reported 
in several studies (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2014; Forster & 
Lavie, 2009; Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, and Smilek, in press; Shaw & Giambra, 1993). An 
early study by Shaw and Giambra (1993), for example, examined rates of what they referred to 
as “spontaneous” and “deliberate” TUTs in individuals diagnosed with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and in healthy controls. Participants completed a 
vigilance task in which they were presented a series of large and small ‘X’s, and were 
instructed to make a button press upon presentation of each small ‘x’ and to refrain from 
making a button press when presented with a large ‘X’. Throughout the task, participants were 
 52 
 
asked to report whether they had experienced any TUTs. In particular, upon presentation of 
intermittent ‘thought probes’ (a beep), participants were instructed to report any instances of 
either unintentional (spontaneous) or intentional (deliberate) TUTs that had occurred since the 
termination of the previous probe. On the whole, participants reported that they deliberately 
engaged in TUTs roughly 58% of the time that a probe was presented. Importantly, these 
results suggest that, although mind-wandering researchers often assume that the TUTs indexed 
in their studies are reflective of “mind wandering” – formally defined as internally-focused 
unintentional thought – many of these thoughts believed to reflect mind wandering might 
instead reflect intentionally engaged task-unrelated thought. 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned results, let us return to consideration of the 
potential role of motivation on performance in studies of mind wandering. If one considers the 
participant who deliberately engages in TUTs during laboratory tasks, one reasonable 
hypothesis is that this participant would, if questioned on the matter, report low levels of 
motivation to perform well on the task given to him. Indeed, it would seem incongruous for a 
highly motivated participant to intentionally engage in off-task thought, since doing so would 
presumably result in performance decrements. On the other hand, if we consider the participant 
who is highly motivated to perform well on her task, and to thus refrain from engaging in 
TUTs, it is reasonable to assume that if this participant does engage in off-task thoughts, these 
thoughts will occur unintentionally, as this participant would arguably be motivated to refrain 
from engaging in off-task thought. If these assumptions are valid, then they suggest the 
interesting possibility that TUTs associated with low motivation might be qualitatively 
different from TUTs that occur despite higher levels of motivation. 
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Although motivation and deliberate mind wandering would seem to be obviously 
intimately related, to the best of our knowledge the relation between motivation and 
intentionality of TUTs has not yet been examined. However, a recent study (Unsworth and 
McMillan, 2013) did examine motivation and TUTs during a reading comprehension task, and, 
to this end, had participants read half of a chapter from a college-level political science 
textbook. While reading, participants were occasionally presented thought probes to assess 
whether they were mind wandering (i.e., engaged in task-unrelated thought) just prior to the 
presentation of each probe. After completing the reading task, participants were given a 
reading-comprehension test on the material they had just read, followed by two questions 
assessing their motivation to do well on the reading-comprehension test. Critically, Unsworth 
and McMillan reported that the relation of motivation and task performance (in this case, 
reading comprehension; e.g., Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; 
Struthers, Perry, & Menec, 2000) was fully mediated by TUTs: Participants who had lower 
levels of motivation were more likely to engage in TUTs during the reading task, and in turn, 
this increased propensity to engage in off-task thought negatively predicted test performance.  
Whereas Unsworth and McMillan (2013) were primarily interested in predictors of 
reading comprehension rather than the conceptual and theoretical implications of their finding 
for mind-wandering research in general, their results suggest that motivation is potentially an 
important variable to consider in all studies of mind wandering. Indeed, as noted, many mind-
wandering researchers have expressed interest in unintentional TUTs that occur despite 
people’s best intentions to focus on their external environment (e.g., He et al., 2010; Kane & 
McVay, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood et al., 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006); 
that is, TUTs that occur unintentionally when participants are highly motivated to perform well 
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and to refrain from engaging in off-task thought. However, given the finding that low 
motivation is predictive of high levels of TUT, there is the possibility that many studies of 
mind wandering have instead, or in addition, assessed intentional off-task thought that occurs 
when participants have little motivation to remain attentive to, and perform well on, the task. 
Thus, the previously observed relations of mind wandering and task performance might well be 
driven primarily by participants who have low motivation to engage in the tasks we give them, 
and who, consequently, intentionally engage in off-task thought.  
In the present study, we explored this possibility by assessing TUTs (both intentional 
and unintentional), task performance, and motivation in a sustained-attention task: the 
Metronome Response Task (MRT; Seli, Cheyne & Smilek, 2013). For this task, participants 
are presented a continuous series of tones and are instructed to respond synchronously with 
each tone (via button press) such that each response is to be made at the exact time at which 
each tone is presented. To perform well on the MRT, participants must continually attend to 
the temporal structure of the task to anticipate the presentation of each upcoming tone. 
Variability in response times to the tones is thus taken as an indicator of failures of sustained 
attention, with increased response variability reflecting poorer sustained attention (Seli, 
Carriere, Thomson, et al., 2014; Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2013; Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013). Throughout the MRT, we 
sampled participants’ thoughts by intermittently presenting thought probes to which 
participants could respond: (1) focused on the task, (2) intentionally thinking about task-
unrelated thoughts, or (3) unintentionally thinking about task-unrelated thoughts.  
We first sought to determine whether, as reported by Shaw and Giambra (1993), 
participants frequently engage in intentional TUTs during a sustained-attention task (i.e., the 
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MRT). We then analyzed the relations among motivation and TUTs (overall as well as 
intentional and unintentional). Next, we examined the relations among motivation and TUTs 
(both intentional and unintentional) and performance on the MRT. Finally, we sought to 
replicate Unsworth and McMillan’s (2013) finding that the relation of motivation and 
performance was fully mediated by overall TUT rates, and extended this work by also 
examining the possible differential roles that intentional and unintentional mind wandering 
might play in the complex relationship of motivation, TUTs, and performance. 
Study 3 Method 
 
 Participants 
Participants were 166 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of Waterloo. Two participants did not report any mind wandering and thus did not 
contribute data to any analyses examining the proportion of mind wandering that was 
intentional/unintentional (i.e., “Proportion Intentional”; see Results section). For the sake of 
simplicity in reporting the results, we excluded these participants’ data from all analyses 
below. Importantly, however, the inclusion of these participants’ data did not affect any of the 
results reported here.  
Apparatus 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by an Acer Aspire AX1930-ES10P desktop 
computer. The MRT program was constructed using E-Prime 1.2 software (Psychology 
Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). Auditory stimuli were presented to participants via Sony 
MDR-XD200 Stereo Headphones. We report all measures collected in our study. 
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The Metronome Response Task (MRT) 
The MRT (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) is a sustained-attention task requiring 
participants to attentively monitor a sequence of tones in order to provide a key-press response 
in synchrony with the periodic metronome tones. The rationale behind the task is as follows: If 
one’s attention lapses at any time during task completion, then the estimation of when the tone 
will occur will be affected and thus the timing of one’s responses will become more variable.  
In the present study, each MRT trial began with 650 ms of silence followed by the 
presentation of a tone (lasting 75 ms) and a further 575 ms of silence. Thus, the total trial 
duration was 1300 ms. Participants were instructed to respond (i.e., “press the spacebar”) 
synchronously with each tone so that their responses were made at the exact time at which each 
tone was presented. Participants first completed 18 practice trials intended to familiarize them 
with the task, after which they completed 900 experimental trials. One thought probe was 
randomly presented in each block of 50 trials, for a total of 18 probes. Upon presentation of 
each probe, the MRT stopped and participants were asked to indicate (via key press) whether 
they were, just prior to the onset of the probe, (1) on task, (2) intentionally thinking about task-
unrelated thoughts, or (3) unintentionally thinking about task-unrelated thoughts. After 
providing a response to each thought probe, participants were instructed to press the spacebar 
to resume the MRT. 
MRT Measures  
Rhythmic-Response Times (RRTs; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) were calculated on 
each trial as the difference between the onset of each tone and the associated button press. The 
mean RRT thus indexes the extent to which participants approximate the onset of the tone. 
Variability in RRTs is, however, the primary measure of interest yielded by the MRT, and 
 57 
 
hence we computed an RRT variance score by first categorizing RRTs in 5-trial moving 
windows over the task duration. Within each 5-trial window, we then computed the variances 
of the observed RRTs and averaged these variance scores for an overall measure of RRT 
variance (see Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013; Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, & Smilek, in press). To 
minimize problems of contamination in variance resulting from the disruptive nature of the 
thought probes, we excluded from our variance calculations all RRTs collected five trials after 
each probe. RRT variance values were normalized using a natural logarithm transformation 
(see Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013).  
Task Motivation  
 Immediately following the MRT, participants were presented a single-item question 
asking them about the extent to which they were motivated during the task. Specifically, 
participants were asked “How motivated were you to perform well on the task?” (Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013). The anchor ratings for this question were 1 (not motivated at all) and 7 (very 
motivated), and participants indicated their level of motivation by making a key-press.  
Study 3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for all measures are presented in Table 10. As can be seen in 
Table 10, all measures were approximately normally distributed, and skewness and kurtosis 
values were within an acceptable range (i.e., skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 4; Kline, 1998).  
First, we were interested in examining the proportion of overall TUTs that was engaged 
intentionally. As can been seen in Table 10, and consistent with Shaw and Giambra’s (1993) 
findings, here we found that a considerable proportion of TUTs (.41) reported by participants 
was engaged intentionally.  
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for All Measures (N = 164) 
Measure       M        SD      Range           Skew     Kurtosis 
      
Overall RRT Variance 8.37 0.74 6.81-10.72 .549 .596 
Overall TUTs  .61 0.25 .06-1 -.362 -.813 
Intentional TUTs .26 0.22 0-1 1.029 .549 
Unintentional TUTs .34 0.20 0-.94 .469 -.194 
Proportion of TUTs that was  
Intentional 
.41 0.27 
 
0-1 
.274 -.704 
Motivation 3.66 1.47 1-7 -.106 -.658 
      
Note. Overall RRT variance = Overall Rhythmic Response Time variance; Overall TUTs = the 
proportion of thought probes to which participants reported engaging in TUT; Intentional 
TUTs = the proportion of thought probes to which participants reported intentionally engaging 
in TUT; Unintentional TUTs = the proportion of thought probes to which participants reported 
unintentionally engaging in TUT; Proportion of TUTs that was Intentional (prop(I/TUT)) = the 
proportion of overall TUTs that was engaged intentionally; Motivation = Self-reported 
motivation to do well on the MRT. 
 
 
Next, we sought to explore the relations among Motivation and Proportion of Overall 
TUTs, as well as Motivation and Proportion of TUTs that was Intentional. To clarify, the 
computation of the Proportion of TUTs that was Intentional – denoted as prop(I/TUT) – 
involved dividing the number of intentional TUT reports by the number of reports of 
intentional plus unintentional TUTs (i.e., overall TUTs).  We chose to focus on prop(I/TUT) 
because the dependencies inherent in the ipsative nature of intentional and unintentional mind 
wandering reports precluded directly comparing intentional and unintentional mind wandering 
reports. Consistent with previous work (Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), we found a significant 
negative relation of Motivation and Overall TUTs, r(164) = -.48, p < .001, indicating that 
individuals who were less motivated to do well on the MRT engaged in more TUTs. Critically, 
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we also observed a significant negative relation between the Prop(I/TUT) and Motivation, 
r(164) = -.21, p < .01, demonstrating that, as motivation to do well on the task decreased, the 
proportion of overall TUTs that were intentional increased (see Table 11 for Pearson Product-
Moment correlations of all measures).  
Table 11.  Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Measures (N = 164) 
 
 Overall 
TUTs 
Intentional TUTs Unintentional TUTs 
Proportion 
of TUTs 
that was  
Intentional 
Motivation 
      
Overall RRT Variance 
.31
**
 .18
*
 .19
*
 .03    -.25
**
 
Overall TUTs  
 .65
**
 .50
**
  .21
**
  -.48
**
 
Intentional TUTs 
  -.33
**
  .80
**
   -.42
**
 
Unintentional TUTs 
    -.65
**
 -.12 
Proportion of TUTs that was  Intentional 
      -.21
**
 
      
 
Note1. ** p < .001, * p < .05 
Note2. Overall RRT variance = Overall Rhythmic Response Time variance; Overall TUTs = 
the proportion of thought probes to which participants reported engaging in TUT; Intentional 
TUTs = the proportion of thought probes to which participants reported intentionally engaging 
in TUT; Unintentional TUTs = the proportion of thought probes to which participants reported 
unintentionally engaging in TUT; Proportion of TUTs that was Intentional (prop(I/TUT)) = the 
proportion of overall TUTs that was engaged intentionally; Motivation = Self-reported 
motivation to do well on the MRT. 
 
Given that participants reported that a considerable number of their TUTs were 
engaged intentionally, there is the possibility that in other studies of mind wandering that do 
not distinguish between intentional and unintentional TUTs, participants’ reports of TUTs are 
composed of both intentional and unintentional TUTs. To explore this possibility, we 
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compared the overall rate of TUTs in the present study to the overall rate of TUTs from a 
previously published study that used the MRT, but that did not distinguish between intentional 
and unintentional TUTs (Seli, Carriere, Thomson, et al., 2014, Study 1; N = 74)
 1
. Results of an 
independent samples t-test indicated that the Overall TUT rate in the present study (M = .61, 
SD = 0.25) was not significantly different from the overall TUT rate in Seli and colleagues’ 
study (M =.62, SD = 0.22), t(236) = 0.47, SE = 0.03, p = .64, d  = .07. This finding is consistent 
with, though not a direct test of, the hypothesis that when reporting unspecified TUTs, 
participants may be reporting both intentional and unintentional TUTs. Thus, studies that do 
not distinguish between intentional and unintentional off-task thought may well be conflating 
these two types of thought.  
In our next set of analyses, we examined the relation of TUTs (both the proportion of 
Overall TUTs and prop(I/TUT)) and performance on the MRT (i.e., overall RRT Variance). As 
expected, we found that individuals who reported more Overall TUTs also showed increased 
RRT Variance (i.e., poorer performance), r(164) = .31, p < .001. We did not, however, observe 
a significant relation of RRT Variance and Prop(I/TUT), r(164) = .03, p = .71. To determine 
whether these two correlations were significantly different from one another, we conducted a 
Williams test, finding that the correlations were indeed significantly different each other, 
t(161) = 2.97, p < .01. Critically, these findings suggest that participants who frequently 
engage in TUTs will show performance decrements, but that the type of TUT engaged (i.e., 
intentional or unintentional) does not differentially relate to task performance. Unintentional 
and intentional TUTs therefore had similar negative consequences for MRT task performance.  
                                                 
1
 Instead of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional TUTs, Seli, Carriere, Thomson, et al. 
(2014) simply asked participants to report whether they were (1) focused on the task, or (2) thinking task-
unrelated thoughts. Notably, the MRT in both the present study and Seli and colleagues’ study consisted of the 
same number of trials (i.e., 900 trials in each study), and the same number of thought probes (i.e., 18). Thus, the 
TUT rates across the two studies should be comparable.  
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To follow-up on this finding and further test the claim that unintentional and intentional 
TUTs have similar negative consequences for task performance, we next conducted a within-
subjects analysis in which we examined RRT variability associated with reports of (1) being on 
task, (2) unintentionally engaging in TUTs, and (2) intentionally engaging in TUTs. 
Specifically, as in previous work (e.g., Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013), we examined RRT 
variability on the 5 trials preceding each of the three types of probe reports. If unintentional 
and intentional TUTs do indeed have similar negative consequences for task performance, then 
we ought to find that the variance associated with periods of intentional and unintentional 
TUTs are not statistically different. To explore this possibility, we conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA examining the variance associated with each of the three Probe Reports 
(i.e., on task, unintentional TUTs, intentional TUTs) (28 of the 166 participants did not report 
at least one instance of each type of probe response and were therefore excluded from the 
following analyses). Results revealed a significant effect of Probe Report, F(2, 274) = 7.12, 
MSE = 0.37, p = .001, ηp
 2
 = .05. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests revealed that the variance 
associated with periods of intentional (M = 8.51) and unintentional TUT (M = 8.39) was 
greater than variance associated with on-task periods (8.23; both ps < .014). We did not, 
however, observe a significant difference in variance associated with the two types of TUT (p 
= .129)
2
.  
Lastly, we sought to replicate Unsworth and McMillan’s (2013) finding that the 
relation of motivation and task performance is fully mediated by overall TUT rates. Thus, we 
                                                 
2
 As in previous work, we also used linear trend point estimation to impute missing data, which allowed us to 
conduct a repeated-measures ANOVA while using the full sample. Importantly, this analysis yielded the same 
pattern of results showing that variance associated with periods of unintentional and intentional TUTs was 
significantly greater than variance associated with periods of on-task performance (ps < .027), and no difference 
in variance associated with periods of unintentional and intentional TUTs (p = .406).  
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conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which we predicted RRT Variance with 
Motivation (model 1) and Proportion of Overall TUTs (model 2) (see Table 12). As can be 
seen in Table 12, model 1, Motivation was found to significantly negatively predict RRT 
Variance (r = -.25), indicating that individuals who reported higher levels of Motivation to do 
well on the MRT tended to outperform those reporting lower levels of motivation (as indicated 
by lower levels of RRT Variance). When entering Overall TUT rate for the second model of 
the regression analysis, however, Motivation was no longer a significant predictor of RRT 
Variance. On the other hand, Overall TUT rate was found to significantly and positively 
predict RRT Variance on model 2. In a separate Maximum Likelihood analysis we explored 
the mediation effect of overall TUTs only, and found essentially identical coefficients for these 
variables to those in model 3 of Table 12. In addition, significant indirect effects of Motivation 
were observed, Standardized Coefficient = -.12, p < .002. Thus, these findings are consistent 
with Unsworth and McMillan’s finding that the relation of task-based motivation and task 
performance is fully mediated by people’s overall levels of TUT.  
To extend Unsworth and McMillan’s (2013) work, we explored the possibility that the 
extent to which people’s TUTs consist of intentionally-engaged off-task thought (versus 
unintentionally-engaged off-task thought) might play an important role in predicting task 
performance (RRT variance). Thus, in the third model of the hierarchical regression analysis, 
we entered prop(I/TUT). As can be seen in Table 12, model 3, the inclusion of this variable in 
the model did not add to the prediction of RRT Variance. Put differently, when controlling for 
people’s overall level of motivation and overall TUT rates, the proportion of TUTs that was 
engaged intentionally (or unintentionally) did not predict MRT performance. Consistent with 
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results reported above, this finding provides evidence that it is not the type of TUT that 
determines task performance, but is instead the overall rate of off-task thought.  
 
Table 12. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis testing for unique contributions to Overall 
RRT Variance by Motivation (model 1), Proportion of Overall TUTs (model 2), and the 
Proportion of Overall TUTs that was Intentional (model 3) (N = 164) 
 
Dependent variable: Overall RRT Variance 
 
 B S.E. β t p R2Δ pΔ 
        
Model 1        
Motivation -0.12 0.04 -.25 3.23 .002   
      0.06 0.002 
Model 2        
Motivation -0.06 0.04 -0.13 1.49 .139   
Overall TUT  0.76 0.26  0.25 2.95 .004   
      0.05 0.004 
Model 3        
Motivation  -0.07 0.04  -0.13 1.56 .120   
Overall TUT  0.78 0.26   0.26 3.01 .003   
Intentional/Overall TUT -0.14 0.21  -0.05 0.68 .496   
      0.00 0.496 
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Study 3 Discussion 
In the present study, we assessed the intentionality of TUTs reported during a 
sustained-attention task (the MRT), as well as participants’ motivation to perform well on the 
task and overall task performance. Consistent with previous work on the topic (e.g., Shaw & 
Giambra, 1993), and contrary to commonly held assumptions in the literature on mind 
wandering, we found that a considerable number of the TUTs reported during the MRT were 
engaged intentionally. We also found that participants who reported lower levels of motivation 
to perform well on the MRT engaged in more overall TUTs and more intentional relative to 
unintentional TUTs during the task compared to those reporting lower levels of motivation. 
Having established that participants do indeed frequently engage in intentional TUTs, we then 
compared TUT rates from the present study to those from a previously reported study (Seli, 
Carriere, Thomson, et al., 2014) to explore the possibility that other studies of mind wandering 
that do not distinguish between intentional and unintentional TUTs might be inadvertently 
conflating these two types of thought. Results indicated that overall TUT rates were not 
significantly different across these two studies, thereby providing evidence consistent with the 
view that, when reporting unspecified TUTs, participants may be reporting TUTs that are both 
intentional and unintentional. Next, we turned our focus to the relations between TUTs and 
task performance, finding that individuals reporting more overall TUTs performed more poorly 
on the task, and critically, that the type of TUT engaged (intentional or unintentional) did not 
differentially affect task performance (moreover, these results were obtained at the within-
subjects levels). Finally, we sought to replicate Unsworth and McMillan’s (2013) finding that 
the relation of motivation and task performance is fully mediated by TUTs, and found support 
for this view. Extending this work, we also found that the proportion of TUTs that was 
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intentional did not significantly predict task performance, which provided evidence that 
unintentional and intentional TUTs have similar, and perhaps indistinguishable, negative 
consequences for task performance. 
The present findings have theoretical and methodological importance for studies of mind 
wandering. As noted earlier, many researchers of mind wandering have expressed theoretical 
interest in TUTs that specifically occur (1) unintentionally, and (2) when participants are 
motivated to do well on their tasks (e.g., Baars, 2010; Carciofo et al., 2014; Cohen, 2013; He, 
et al., 2011; Klinger, 2009; Kane & McVay, 2012; Mason et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2010; 
O’Callaghan et al., 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; 
Zavagnin et al., 2013). It appears likely, however, that commonly used thought probes index 
both unintentional TUTs as well as intentional TUTs (perhaps resulting from low levels of 
motivation to do well on laboratory tasks). Thus, in future work researchers would do well to 
regularly ensure that they directly identify these differences so that they are not conflated with 
their intentional counterpart. Moreover, the results of the present study suggest that studies of 
mind wandering ought to regularly consider including indices of motivation given that 
participants are evidently not always highly motivated to do well on the tasks given to them. 
By indexing participants’ levels of motivation to perform well on laboratory tasks, it is 
possible to statistically control for motivation differences across participants, thereby allowing 
for the examination of the consequences of mind wandering independently of motivation, 
which has been shown here to be directly related to both mind wandering and task 
performance. In considering the foregoing points, it should be noted that in the present study 
we assessed participants’ motivation after they completed the task (as done in Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013). Thus, there is the possibility that participants’ motivation reports were 
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influenced by their TUT rates. In particular, participants reporting high rates of intentional 
TUTs may have been inclined to in turn report lower motivation. Although it is not clear how 
direction of causality might be addressed via self-reports, experimental manipulations of task 
interest or incentives affecting motivation would seem to be required. In any case, it seems 
likely that the covariation of motivation and mind wandering might well be bidirectional. 
One important implication from the present study is that it may be difficult or impossible in 
some contexts to distinguish between intentional and unintentional mind wandering based on 
performance alone. In the present study, although performance was related to the overall TUT 
rate, it was not related to the type of TUT (intentional vs. unintentional). There remains the 
possibility, however, that the effects of the two different types of TUT on performance may 
depend on context. Consider, for example, the last time you listened to a presentation that 
contained some material with which you were already familiar. When the speaker began to 
cover familiar ground, you may have intentionally engaged in TUTs, allowing these thoughts 
to persist until the speaker began to cover material that was less familiar to you. Importantly, if 
tested on the content of the presentation, it is reasonable to assume that your performance 
would not suffer as a result of your engagement in intentional TUTs because you were able to 
restrict these thoughts to segments of the presentation that contained familiar material. In 
contrast, unintentional TUTs, which are by definition not under strategic control, would more 
likely occur at inopportune times during the presentation, and would thus be associated with 
performance costs. In this example, then, whereas unintentional TUTs would be associated 
with poorer task performance, intentional TUTs would share no such association with 
performance. However, irrespective of whether the intentionality of TUTs does in fact, as 
speculated here, differentially influence performance in a given context, it is advisable to 
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collect subjective reports of intentional and unintentional TUTs, especially if the goal is draw 
conclusions only about unwanted episodes of mind wandering. 
 Contextual factors might also play a critical role in determining the relative prevalence 
of intentional and unintentional bouts of mind wandering. One such important contextual 
factor might be task difficulty. As suggested by the foregoing example about mind wandering 
during a presentation, people may be more likely to engage in intentional TUTs when task 
demands are low (e.g., when presented with familiar material) than when task demands are 
high (e.g., when presented with unfamiliar material). Another important contextual factor 
might be the level of interest. Unsworth and McMillan (2013) have shown that individuals 
reporting higher interest in a task in turn reported higher levels of motivation, and 
consequently engaged in fewer TUTs. Similarly, in assessing mind wandering in everyday life, 
Kane et al. (2007) observed that individuals tended to mind-wander more when they engaged 
in boring or unpleasant activities, which would likely be rated by participants as uninteresting. 
Given the present finding that individuals reporting higher motivation engaged in fewer 
intentional TUTs, it is a reasonable hypothesis that interest might indirectly influence 
intentional TUT rates via its influence on motivation, with higher levels of interest being 
associated with higher levels of motivation, and hence fewer intentional TUTs. Yet another 
relevant contextual factor might be age. Compared to younger adults, older adults tend to 
report the same task as being more difficult, show more interest the task, and engage in fewer 
TUTs (Jackson and Balota, 2012; Jackson Weinstein, & Balota, 2013). If increases in 
perceived task difficulty and interest are indeed associated with fewer intentional TUTs, then 
older adults – who tend to perceive tasks as more difficult and more interesting than do 
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younger adults – might reduce their engagement in intentional TUTs, which might in turn 
result in overall lower TUTs relative to younger adults.  
 In considering the intentionality of TUTs within the broader literature on mind 
wandering, one important note to make is that the conceptual distinction between unintentional 
and intentional TUT bears some resemblance to the distinction between TUTs that occur with 
and without awareness (Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, Luus, 
& Schooler, 2008; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). It seems reasonable that 
people might be mostly aware of their intentional bouts of TUT, at least initially, and mostly 
unaware of their unintentional bouts of TUT, except perhaps near the end of an episode. The 
simple observation that people can self-catch their TUTs without being prompted by a probe 
(e.g., Schooler, Reichle, and Halpern, 2004) suggests that the episode may have begun without 
intention, but was nevertheless brought into awareness at some point. Consistent with this 
view, Schooler (2002), in his review on meta-awareness, stated that “it is unclear whether 
lacking intention is equivalent to lacking awareness” (p. 340). Although there might be 
considerable overlap between intentionality and awareness, we consider these as distinct 
concepts that need to be further evaluated and compared in future research. 
 The present results suggest that distinguishing between intentional and unintentional 
TUTs will be important for future research, and that this more nuanced approach to the study 
of TUTs has the potential to open up additional questions obscured by the conflation of mind-
wandering types. However, we suspect that as more work focuses on the intentionality of 
TUTs, it will become apparent that some episodes of TUT include both intentional and 
unintentional segments. For example, an individual may decide deliberately to engage in TUTs 
because of a lack of motivation, or to alleviate boredom, and so forth, and this might in turn 
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lead to spontaneous (unintentional) thoughts. On the other hand, TUTs might occur 
unintentionally, yet upon realizing that one’s thoughts have drifted inwardly away from the 
external environment, one might deliberately allow the continuation of mind wandering. In 
some cases, it may therefore become difficult (if not impossible) for the participant to 
distinguish deliberate from spontaneous mind wandering. Nevertheless, in future work 
assessing the level of intentionality of TUT, it might be beneficial to provide participants the 
opportunity to report the experience of task-unrelated thinking that is comprised of both 
intentional and unintentional elements, as such experiences (if reportable) may be associated 
with different performance outcomes than experiences in which people are either exclusively 
intentionally or unintentionally engaging in TUTs. 
 
Study 3 Concluding Remarks 
 An implicit assumption often made by mind-wandering researchers is that individual 
differences in task performance and mind-wandering rates assessed in laboratory settings are 
representative of differences in people’s attentional abilities. However, the more fundamental 
assumption upon which this assumption rests is that participants are equally motivated to 
perform well on the laboratory tasks that we give them. The results of the present study suggest 
that, rather than exclusively indexing attentional abilities per se, studies of mind wandering 
may also be assessing the indirect effects of motivation on task performance. Indeed, here we 
found that individuals who reported lower levels of motivation to perform well on the MRT 
also engaged in more TUTs, which was in turn associated with poorer task performance. Thus, 
we suggest that differences in task-based motivation ought to be measured and statistically 
controlled for so that meaningful conclusions about attentional abilities per se can be drawn. 
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Importantly, it should be noted that the argument that deliberate, task-unrelated thought does 
not, according to common conceptualizations, qualify as mind wandering need not imply that 
this dimension of thought is uninteresting, or that it is simply a nuisance variable that must be 
controlled. Indeed, in recent work, some researchers have made an explicit shift in focus from 
mind wandering, defined as unintentional task-unrelated thought, to all types of self-generated 
thought (e.g., Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), providing intriguing insights into the 
nature of human thinking. However, those researchers who are strictly interested in measuring 
mind wandering, conceptualized as unwanted, unintentional thought, must begin to account for 
intentional thought so they do not conflate this type of thought with mind wandering. Indeed, 
distinguishing between intentional and unintentional mind wandering will lead to a greater 
conceptual and theoretical clarity in the field, and will ultimately facilitate progress in the field 
of mind wandering.   
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 Study 4 
The following work is currently under reivew (Seli, Wammes, Risko, & Smilek, under review). 
 
 Highly motivated students often exhibit better academic performance than less 
motivated students. However, to date, the specific cognitive mechanisms through which 
motivation increases academic achievement are not well understood. Here we explored the 
possibility that mind-wandering mediates the relation between motivation and academic 
performance, and, additionally, we examined possible mediation by both intentional and 
unintentional forms of mind-wandering. We found that participants reporting higher 
motivation to learn in a lecture-based setting tended to engage in less mind-wandering, and this 
decrease in mind-wandering was in turn associated with greater retention of the lecture 
material. Critically, we also found that the influence of motivation on retention was mediated 
by both intentional and unintentional types of mind-wandering. Not only do the present results 
advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relation between 
motivation and academic achievement, they also provide insights into possible methods of 
intervention that may be useful in improving student retention in educational settings.  
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Study 4 
 It has been well established that motivation is a key determinant of academic 
achievement, with more highly motivated students typically outperforming their less motivated 
colleagues (e.g., Pintrich, 1999; Schiefele, Krapp, & Winteler, 1992). However, to date, the 
specific cognitive mechanism(s) through which motivation influences academic achievement 
are not well understood, and only recently has research begun to systematically explore such 
mechanisms. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms will undoubtedly play a critical role 
in advancing theory and informing practice in a number of domains in psychology (e.g., 
education, attention, learning, and memory). Recently, it was suggested that the relation 
between motivation and academic performance is mediated by mind-wandering: Specifically, 
that poorly motivated students frequently engage in mind-wandering, which in turn results in 
poorer retention (Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). Here we further refine this theoretical 
proposal by examining whether the relation between motivation and retention might be 
differentially associated with intentional and unintentional forms of mind-wandering. In 
addition, we expand previous research on the relations among motivation, mind-wandering, 
and retention by examining the effects of these variables in a highly familiar, yet to date 
unstudied educational context; namely, during a lecture. Thus, the present investigation both 
advances our theoretical understanding of the mechanism(s) underlying the relation between 
motivation and academic achievement and generalizes this research to this highly familiar 
educational context. 
 In recent work, Unsworth and McMillan (2013) explored the effects of motivation and 
mind-wandering on reading comprehension in a laboratory setting. To this end, the researchers 
had participants read part of a chapter from a textbook, and while reading, participants were 
 73 
 
occasionally presented with thought probes to assess whether they were mind-wandering or 
focused on the task. Following the reading task, participants were tested on the textbook 
material and were then presented two questions assessing their motivation to do well on the 
reading-comprehension test. Critically, the researchers found evidence that the well-established 
relation between motivation and task performance (in this case, reading comprehension; e.g., 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990) was fully mediated by mind-
wandering rates: Participants who reported lower levels of motivation were more likely to 
engage in mind-wandering during the reading task, and this increased propensity to engage in 
mind-wandering negatively predicted test performance (see also Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & 
Smilek, 2015).  
While Unsworth and McMillan (2013) have provided evidence consistent with the 
claim that mind-wandering mediates the relation between motivation and retention, their study 
focused on mind-wandering as a unitary construct. Recent research, however, has 
demonstrated that mind-wandering consists of at least two theoretically and empirically 
distinguishable “types.” Specifically, unintentional mind-wandering reflects a failure of 
executive control, whereas intentional mind-wandering reflects the engagement of controlled 
processes for internal processing. In recent work, these two types of mind-wandering have 
been shown to be differentially predictive of critical variables such as mindfulness (Carriere, 
Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015), fidgeting (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2014), 
and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptomatology (Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2015).What this suggests, then, is the possibility that the relation between motivation 
and retention might depend on the type of mind-wandering that is engaged in educational 
settings.  
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While we expect both intentional and unintentional mind-wandering will influence 
retention in an educational setting (e.g., Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015), we predicted that these 
types of mind-wandering might be differentially related to motivation, and as such, that they 
may play different roles in mediating the relation between motivation and performance. 
Specifically, we thought that individuals reporting little motivation to attend to the lecture 
would frequently intentionally disengage from the lecture in the service of focusing on their 
lecture-unrelated thoughts. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that people’s 
levels of motivation might not be associated with their propensity to unintentionally engage in 
mind-wandering since such mental experiences are, by definition, not under the participants’ 
control. Following from these predictions, we would expect that intentional mind-wandering 
would mediate the relation between motivation and performance, whereas unintentional mind-
wandering would not. 
 Determining whether intentional and unintentional mind-wandering are uniquely 
related to motivation and test performance could also have important implications for 
interventions designed to improve learning. It is commonly assumed that mind-wandering 
occurs primarily without unintentionally, and that it represents a failure of executive control 
(e.g., Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2010; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013). If mind-
wandering in educational settings is indeed primarily unintentional, then the focus of 
interventions might be on modifying the way in which material is presented, such that the 
delivery of the material is continually salient and exogenously draws attention. For instance, 
the focus might be on increasing the use of multi-media in lectures (Lenzner, Schnotz, & 
Müller, 2013).  If, however, at least some of the mind-wandering that occurs in educational 
settings is engaged with intention, this finding would suggest that researchers and pedagogical 
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practitioners should also focus on methods of intervention aimed at reducing intentional, 
controlled mind-wandering (for instance, by increasing incentives to focus on the lecture rather 
than intentionally disengage from it).  
 While understanding the general relations among motivation, mind-wandering, and 
performance is of theoretical interest, understanding how these variables interact in lecture 
settings is particularly important. In Unsworth and McMillan (2013), the researchers focused 
specifically on reading comprehension. Here we extend this work to the lecture setting, which 
is one of the most common pedagogical formats. In a series of recent papers, researchers have 
begun to better understand the relation between mind-wandering and retention of lecture 
material (e.g., Risko et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2013; Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013). 
Similar to research examining reading comprehension, this work has revealed that mind-
wandering is negatively associated with retention of lecture material. Critically, however, there 
has been no previous work investigating the relation between motivation, mind-wandering, and 
retention in lectures, and no research investigating different forms of mind-wandering (i.e., 
intentional vs. unintentional) in the lecture context.  
 In the present study participants viewed a video-recorded lecture, and at various points 
throughout the lecture, we presented thought probes that were used to identify periods of 
intentional mind-wandering, unintentional mind-wandering, and/or on-task focus. Following 
the lecture, we tested participants on their retention of the lecture material, after which they 
reported how motivated they were to perform well on the task. A series of correlation and 
mediation analyzes are performed to assess predictions with respect to the relation between 
overall, intentional, and unintentional mind-wandering, motivation, and lecture retention. 
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Study 4 Method 
  Participants. One-hundred and twenty undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of Waterloo participated in exchange for partial course credit. 
 Stimuli. Participants viewed a video recording of a live lecture given in a lecture hall 
(the video was obtained from Open Yale Courses; http://oyc.yale.edu/). The lecture was 
roughly 25 minutes in length and focused on mortality decline in Europe from the 1500s to the 
1900s.  
 Thought probes. Throughout the lecture, participants were randomly presented one 
thought probe in each of a succeeding series of 90-second blocks (16 probes). Upon 
presentation of each probe, the lecture was paused until a response was given. The probes 
asked participants to indicate whether they were just (1) focused on the task, (2) intentionally 
mind-wandering, and/or (3) unintentionally mind-wandering. Participants were allowed to 
select just one response, if appropriate (e.g., intentionally mind-wandering), or to select any 
combination of responses (e.g., intentionally and unintentionally mind-wandering) by using the 
mouse to click boxes placed beside each of the three response options. We used this method 
rather than forcing participants to choose only one response because, in the case of the forced-
choice methodology, there is a structurally-forced negative correlation of the different report 
types (i.e., the data are ipsative), which precludes analyses examining the independent 
contributions of these different report types.  
 Retention of Lecture Material. Following the lecture, participants were presented 
nine multiple-choice questions about the content of the lecture. These were presented one at a 
time, in a randomized order. Participants were given as much time as needed to respond to 
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each question, and after providing a response, the next question appeared. Each question had 
four possible response options, only one of which was correct.  
 Motivation. Following the retention test, participants were presented a single-item 
question asking them “How motivated were you to perform well on the task?” (Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013). The anchor ratings for this question were 1 (not motivated at all) and 7 (very 
motivated). 
 Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor. They were 
instructed to attend to the lecture and to do their best to retain the material presented because 
they would be tested on this material. They were also told that, throughout the lecture, they 
would be presented with probes asking them to report whether they were on-task, intentionally 
mind-wandering, unintentionally mind-wandering, or any combination of these three reports. 
Following the lecture, the retention test was administered, followed by a single-item question 
asking about the participant’s motivation.  
 Measures. For each participant, we computed three thought-probe measures. These 
included the proportion of: (1) on-task reports, (2) intentional mind-wandering reports, and (3) 
unintentional mind-wandering reports. In addition, we computed each participant’s mean 
accuracy on the retention test by averaging their scores (1 for correct and 0 for incorrect) 
across the 9 multiple-choice questions. Finally, our measure of task-based motivation was the 
response to the single-item motivation question.  
Study 4 Results 
We present descriptive statistics for all measures in Table 13. As seen in Table 13, the 
skewness and kurtosis values for the proportion of intentional mind-wandering were beyond an 
acceptable range (i.e., skewness > 2 and kurtosis > 4; Kline, 1998). We therefore transformed 
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these data using a square-root transformation, which brought the skewness and kurtosis values 
into an acceptable range (post-transformation skewness = .46, and post-transformation kurtosis 
= -.73)
3
. In further examining Table 13, it is worth noting is that participants correctly 
responded to 63% of the retention test question, which was significantly higher than chance 
performance (25%), t(119) = 19.48, SE = 0.38, p< .001.  
 
Table 13. Psychometric Properties of All Primary Measures (N = 120) 
 
 
Mean (SD) Skewness
1
 Kurtosis
2
 
    
On-task .737 (0.21)  -0.90  0.79 
Intentional MW .088 (0.12)   2.07   6.00 
Unintentional MW .239 (0.18)   0.87   1.47 
Motivation   4.73 (1.35)  -0.58  0.90 
Retention .632 (.22)  -0.35  -0.69 
    
Note. 
1
Std. Error = .221, 
2
Std. Error = .438 
 
 Next, we examined the Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients for all 
primary measures. In addition, we were interested in exploring how overall mind-wandering 
(i.e., the proportion of reports of intentional mind-wandering, unintentional mind-wandering, 
and concurrent experience of intentional and unintentional mind-wandering) related to our 
primary measures. To clarify, anytime a participant reported any form of mind-wandering – be 
                                                 
3
 In all subsequent analyses examining Intentional Mind-Wandering, the transformed data with corrected 
skewness and kurtosis levels were used. 
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it intentional, unintentional, or a combination of both – this contributed to the measure of 
overall mind-wandering. Results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 14.  
Table 14.  Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Primary Measures as well as Overall Mind-
wandering (N = 120) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 
 
       
1. On task 
-.57
***
 -.69
***
 -.81
***
    .31
***
      .44
***
  
2. Intentional mind-wandering  
  .30
***
  .68
***
  -.26
**
   -.27
**
  
3. Unintentional mind-wandering 
   .88
***
 -.23
*
    -.30
***
  
4. Overall mind-wandering 
      -.29
***
    -.36
***
  
5. Motivation 
      .18
*
  
6. Retention 
    -   
       
Note 1. *** p < .001,  ** p < .01, * p < .05.  
 
Consistent with previous research (Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015), we observed a significant 
positive correlation between proportion of on-task reports and motivation, indicating that 
individuals who reported higher motivation to perform well on the task more frequently 
reported being focused on the task. We also observed a positive correlation between the 
proportion of on-task reports and accuracy on the retention test: Individuals reporting more 
periods of on-task focus were more likely to perform well on the retention test. Also of interest 
was the finding that both intentional and unintentional mind-wandering were negatively 
associated with accuracy on the retention test, as did overall mind-wandering. Lastly, we found 
that motivation was negatively associated with each type of mind-wandering (intentional and 
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unintentional) as well as overall mind-wandering, and, in addition, we observed a positive 
correlation between motivation and accuracy on the retention test.  
Taken together, these results suggest the possibility that the association of motivation 
and task performance may be, as hypothesized, mediated by mind-wandering. Thus, in our 
next analysis, we formally tested this hypothesis by conducting a mediation analysis. To 
estimate indirect effects in our mediation models we used the PROCESS modelling tool 
(Hayes, 2012), set to Model 4, with 1000 bootstrap samples, and a 95% confidence level for 
confidence intervals. The mediation model with unstandardized regression coefficients is 
depicted in Figure 3. Critically, the indirect effect, .0153 [95% CI: .0052 - .0338], was 
significant (i.e., the 95% CI did not include 0) suggesting that the influence of motivation on 
task performance is mediated by mind-wandering.  
 Consistent with our hypothesis, the results of the mediation analysis indicate that mind-
wandering is a mechanism through which motivation influences the retention of lecture 
material. Specifically, individuals reporting higher levels of motivation tend to less frequently 
engage in mind-wandering, which is in turn associated with improved retention relative to 
individuals reporting low motivation. 
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Figure 3. PROCESS mediation model depicting the relationship between self-reported 
motivation and retention of lecture material, with overall mind-wandering rate as a mediator. 
The direct effect of motivation on retention through mind-wandering is reported as c’, while 
the total effect of motivation on retention is in parentheses below (c). The significance of the 
coefficients is represented using the following notation: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Having found that the relation of motivation and retention is mediated by overall mind-
wandering rates, we next wanted to examine the possibility that the relation of motivation and 
retention is mediated both by intentional mind-wandering and by unintentional mind-
wandering. Intentional and unintentional mind-wandering were significantly correlated with 
one another, but we did not predict this to be a causal relation. Accordingly, rather than house 
both variables in the same mediation model, separate models were tested for each mind-
wandering response. To be conservative in our analyses, when testing for indirect effects 
through one type of mind-wandering, the other type of mind-wandering response was included 
in the model as a covariate, acting on both the mediator and the outcome variable (retention).  
We first turned our attention to intentional mind-wandering. The PROCESS modelling 
tool (Hayes, 2012) was used to estimate the indirect effect through intentional mind-wandering 
(controlling for unintentional mind-wandering). PROCESS was set to Model 4, with 1000 
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bootstrap samples, and a 95% confidence level for confidence intervals. The mediation model 
with unstandardized regression coefficients is depicted in Figure 4. The indirect effect through 
intentional mind-wandering was significant, .0060 [95% CI: .0005 - .0171] (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. PROCESS mediation model depicting the relationship between self-reported 
motivation and retention of lecture material, with intentional mind-wandering rate as a 
mediator, and unintentional mind-wandering as a covariate on both the mediator (intentional 
mind-wandering) and the outcome variable (retention). The direct effect of motivation on 
retention through intentional mind-wandering is reported as c’, while the total effect of 
motivation on retention is in parentheses below (c). The significance of the coefficients is 
represented using the following notation: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
  
The indirect effect through unintentional mind-wandering was analyzed in the same 
manner, with intentional mind-wandering included as a covariate. Note that the direct effect of 
motivation on unintentional mind-wandering was marginal (p  = .077). However, critically, the 
indirect effect through unintentional mind-wandering, .0058 [95% CI: .0003 - .0218], was 
significant (i.e., the 95% CIs did not include 0; see Figure 5). In both models, the direct effect 
was not significant, p = .368, consistent with the notion that the effect of motivation on later 
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retention of lecture material was mediated by both unintentional and intentional mind-
wandering. 
 
 
Figure 5. PROCESS mediation model depicting the relationship between self-reported 
motivation and retention of lecture material, with unintentional mind-wandering rate as a 
mediator, and intentional mind-wandering as a covariate on both the mediator (unintentional 
mind-wandering) and the outcome variable (retention). The direct effect of motivation on 
retention through unintentional mind-wandering is reported as c’, while the total effect of 
motivation on retention is in parentheses below (c). The significance of the coefficients is 
represented using the following notation: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
Study 4 Discussion 
 
 Here we examined a recent proposal that motivation-triggered shifts of attention toward 
educational material may be a key mechanism through which motivation acts on academic 
performance. Consistent with this theoretical view, we found that individuals reporting higher 
motivation to learn in a lecture-based setting tended to engage in less mind-wandering, and this 
decrease in mind-wandering was in turn associated with greater retention of the lecture 
material. Critically, we also found that the influence of motivation on retention is mediated by 
both intentional and unintentional mind-wandering: Participants who reported higher levels of 
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motivation tended to engage in less intentional and unintentional mind-wandering, and 
reductions in each of these types of mind-wandering were associated with improved retention. 
Thus, the proposed link between motivation and retention through mind-wandering follows 
two independent paths: one through intentional mind-wandering and one through unintentional 
mind-wandering. 
 The discovery that motivation was negatively associated with unintentional mind-
wandering and also mediated the relation between motivation and retention was particularly 
surprising. We had anticipated that motivation would be uniquely negatively associated with 
intentional mind-wandering as it would seem inappropriate for a highly motivated participant 
to frequently engage in intentional mind-wandering. At first blush, it is not obvious why 
motivation would be related to unintentional bouts of mind-wandering. However, upon 
consideration of this result, we reasoned that this relation may exist because (1) people who are 
highly motivated to do well are also more motivated to catch themselves mind-wandering and 
to terminate this process, and/or (2) being highly motivated results in greater on-task focus, 
which buffers people from intrusive, unintentional mental activity. Future work exploring the 
two theoretical paths through which motivation influences retention is likely to yield further 
insights into these important relations. 
In addition to having important theoretical implications, the present results are of 
particular importance for pedagogical purposes. While efforts to minimize “mind-wandering” 
have specifically focused on reducing the occurrence of unintentional task-unrelated thoughts 
(e.g., Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012), the results of our study suggest that attempts to 
reduce intentional task-unrelated thoughts should also improve students’ retention of 
educational material. One possible way to reduce intentional mind-wandering may be to 
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frequently administer tests during lectures. Indeed, recent work (Szpunar et al., 2013) has 
demonstrated that intermittent testing during lectures reduces mind-wandering and improves 
learning, possibly because the testing episode provides feedback that helps counteract a 
student’s typical overconfidence in his or her learning (Szpunar, Jing, and Schacter, 2014).  As 
students who are overconfident in their knowledge of the lecture material might be particularly 
inclined to intentionally disengage from the lecture, the correction in confidence that comes 
with testing might have the impact of reducing intentional mind-wandering. Another 
potentially effective way to reduce intentional mind-wandering might be to simply inform 
students about the deleterious consequences of intentional mind-wandering and to encourage 
them to avoid disengaging intentionally. After all, by definition, intentional mind-wandering is 
under one’s control. 
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 Study 5 
The following work is currently under review (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, under review). 
 
 There is sufficient evidence to indicate that state-level deliberate and spontaneous mind 
wandering are, at times, differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest to 
mind-wandering researchers. However, to date, no research has examined the possibility that 
deliberate and spontaneous forms of mind wandering can be differentially affected by an 
experimental manipulation. Such a demonstration would be of importance because (1) mind-
wandering researchers frequently use experimental manipulations to influence rates of mind 
wandering, and (2) the conclusions drawn in these sorts of studies invariably assume the 
existence of a unidimensional construct of mind wandering (i.e., unintentional, spontaneous 
thought) without consideration of the possibility their manipulations are selectively influencing 
one type of mind wandering (e.g., deliberate) and not the other (e.g., spontaneous). Here, we 
examined the possibility that manipulating task difficulty across two conditions (an easy and a 
difficult condition) would produce different rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind 
wandering. Although results indicated that overall mind wandering did not differ across the 
easy and difficult conditions, we found the relative rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind 
wandering did: Participants in the easy condition experienced more deliberate and less 
spontaneous mind wandering relative to those in the difficult condition.  
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In recent years, there have been substantial advances in describing factors that lead to 
changes in mind wandering rates across situations.  Perhaps the most abundant evidence for 
variation in mind-wandering rates across experimental manipulations comes from work 
demonstrating that individuals mind-wander more during easy relative to difficult tasks (e.g., 
Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013; Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2013). For example, mind 
wandering tends to be much higher while people read familiar high-frequency words than 
when they are required to read unfamiliar low-frequency words (Thomson et al., 2013). Other 
related research examining manipulations that affect mind-wandering rates has shown, for 
example, that mind wandering increases when (1) people’s current concerns are cued (McVay 
& Kane, 2013), (2) negative mood is induced (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 
2009), (3) alcohol is consumed (Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009), and (4) stereotype-threat 
is elicited (Mrazek, Chin, et al., 2011). Conversely, research has also shown that mind 
wandering decreases when (1) people engage in mindfulness meditation training prior to 
completing a focal task (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013), (2) quizzes are 
interspersed during lectures (Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013), and (3) people are presented 
primes intended to elicit honesty (Vinski & Watter, 2012).  Delineating the factors that 
influence mind wandering rates has been important because they provide valuable insights into 
the causes of mind wandering, as well as methods with which to reduce its occurrence.  
The general assumption underlying the interpretation of the foregoing studies has been 
that the observed variations in mind wandering across situations involve spontaneous, 
unintentional episodes of mind wandering.  However, recent research has arrived at a more 
nuanced understanding of mind wandering, demonstrating that overall mind wandering can be 
decomposed into spontaneous (unintentional) and deliberate (intentional) forms, and 
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importantly, that deliberate mind wandering can sometimes be a major component of overall 
levels of mind wandering (e.g., Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2014; 
Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015).  This more nuanced understanding has called into 
question the widespread assumption that mind wandering is exclusively spontaneous 
(unintentional; e.g., Baars, 2010; Carciofo, Du, Song, & Zhang, 2014; Cohen, 2013; He, Becic, 
Lee, & McCarley, 2011; Klinger, 2009; Kane & McVay, 2012; Mason et al., 2007; McVay & 
Kane, 2010; O’Callaghan, Shine, Lewis, Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2013; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, 
& Schooler, 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). 
Moreover, this understanding has important theoretical implications since existing theories 
treat mind wandering as reflecting unintended failures of control (e.g., Kane & McVay, 2012; 
McVay & Kane, 2010) and as being distinct from intentional thinking (e.g., Baars, 2010; 
Carciofo et al., 2014; Cohen, 2013; He et al., 2011; Klinger, 2009). It also raises the interesting 
possibility that previous demonstrations of variations in mind wandering across situations 
might have affected not only spontaneous mind wandering rates, as typically assumed, but 
rates of deliberate mind wandering as well. 
In the present study we sought to examine the influence of a manipulation of task 
difficulty on deliberate and spontaneous types of mind wandering. To examine this issue, we 
employed a difficult and an easy version of the Sustained Attention to Response Task; SART; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The “difficult” version consisted of 
the standard SART which requires repeated responding (key presses) to a series of randomly 
presented digits (1-9; GO stimuli) and withholding of that response when an infrequent 
(NOGO) stimulus appears (e.g., “3”). The “easy” version of the SART was designed such that 
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the occurrence of each NOGO digit was completely predictable. That is, the digits 1 through 9 
were presented in sequential order; thus, unlike the Standard SART, each NOGO digit (‘3’) 
always followed the digit ‘2’, which always followed the digit ‘1’, and so forth. While these 
tasks yield a number of useful measures (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009), for 
present purposes the key measures of performance in both difficult and easy versions are (1) 
the proportion of time participants fail to withhold a response to the NOGO stimuli and (2) the 
speed of responding to GO stimuli (Robertson et al., 1997; Jonker, Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 
2013; Seli, Cheyne, Barton, & Smilek, 2012).  Critically, in both versions of the SART 
participants were also presented with thought probes asking them whether they were “on task”, 
“mind wandering intentionally” or “mind wandering unintentionally.”  
The two variations of the SART were used to manipulate task difficulty because there 
is reason to suspect that variation in task demands might affect rates of both deliberate and 
spontaneous mind wandering. The rationale for this assumption is as follows: When 
completing an easy task – assuming the task is sufficiently easy so as to allow participant 
disengagement without much in the way of performance costs – it is reasonable to suspect that 
people may deliberately disengage from the task in service of mind wandering. Indeed, mind 
wandering can, at times, serve beneficial functions such as allowing people to make plans, 
problem solve, and so on (for a review of the benefits of mind wandering, see Mooneyham & 
Schooler, 2013). Thus, cases where people can afford to engage in mind wandering without 
incurring performance costs on their primary task, it is plausible that they might intentionally 
disengage from their primary task and turn their thoughts inwardly such that they can engage 
in the beneficial processes that are known to be associated with mind wandering. On the other 
hand, when completing a difficult task – assuming the task is sufficiently difficult so as to not 
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allow for disengagement without serious performance costs – people should engage in 
deliberate mind wandering less often since doing so would lead to serious performance costs. 
Taken together, the foregoing suggests that there should be more deliberate mind wandering in 
the easy relative to the difficult task. 
In considering rates of spontaneous mind wandering across the easy and difficult tasks, 
one reasonable prediction is that participants completing the easy task will report less 
spontaneous mind wandering than those completing the difficult task. Indeed, as indicated 
above, the easy task should allow for what one might refer to as strategic control: That is, the 
deliberate engagement of mind wandering in cases where people are afforded the opportunity 
to mind-wander without incurring performance costs (because task demands are low). In a case 
where a task is made easier by allowing the use of strategic control, it is plausible that the 
engagement of such control might dampen the occurrence of spontaneous mind wandering, or, 
put differently, prevent spontaneous mind wandering from co-opting participants’ available 
cognitive resources, since spontaneous mind wandering is believed to reflect a lack of control 
(e.g., McVay & Kane, 2010). On the other hand, given that the difficult task does not permit 
strategic control to the extent that the easy task does, participants should be less likely to 
engage strategic control over their mind wandering, which suggests that, when mind wandering 
does occur, it should more frequently be of the spontaneous type. Thus, we predict that there 
will be fewer reports of spontaneous mind wandering in the easy condition relative to the 
difficult condition because participants in the easy condition should engage more cognitive 
control, which should in turn minimize the occurrence of spontaneous, uncontrolled, thoughts.  
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Study 5 Method 
 Participants. Participants were 113 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of Waterloo. 
The Standard Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Difficult). On each 
Standard SART trial, a single digit was presented for 250 ms in the centre of the monitor, after 
which time an encircled “x” mask was presented for 900 ms (total trial duration = 1150 ms). 
For each block of 9 trials, a single digit (1-9) was randomly chosen without replacement, and 
was presented in white on a black background. Thus, each of the digits appeared with equal 
frequency across the experimental trials. The digit sizes were randomly varied across all trials, 
with equal sampling of five possible font sizes (120, 100, 94, 72, and 48 points); this was to 
ensure that participants were not simply making their response decision on the basis of familiar 
features of a given stimulus. Participants were instructed to respond (by pressing the spacebar) 
to each GO digit (i.e., digits 1-2, and 4-9) and to withhold responses to each NOGO digit (i.e., 
3). After 18 practice trials (containing 2 NOGO digits), participants completed 900 
experimental trials (containing 100 NOGO digits). 
 The Sequential Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Easy). All details of 
the sequential SART were identical to those of the Standard SART, except that the series of 
digits was completely predictable. Specifically, the digits were presented in sequential order (1 
through 9). 
 Thought probes. Throughout both versions of the SART (i.e., the Standard and 
Sequential SARTs), mind wandering was sampled using intermittent thought probes. One 
thought probe was randomly presented in each block of 50 trials, for a total of 18 probes. 
When a probe occurred, the task temporarily stopped and the participant was presented with 
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the following instruction:  “STOP! Which of the following responses best characterizes your 
mental state RIGHT NOW.” The possible response options were: (1) On task, (2) Intentionally 
mind wandering (3) Unintentionally mind wandering. Participants were instructed to respond 
to one of these options via key press (1-3), after which the SART resumed. After responding to 
each probe, the SART  
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to complete either the Standard SART 
(Difficult condition) or the Sequential SART (Easy condition). They were then brought into the 
testing room and seated in front of a computer monitor. They were given instructions to 
familiarize them with the requirements of the SART (instructions were identical across both 
versions of the SART). Prior to beginning the experiment, they were also given detailed 
instructions regarding thought-probe responses. Participants were told that being on task meant 
that they were thinking about things related to the task (e.g. thoughts about their performance 
on the task, thoughts about the digits, or thoughts about their response), whereas mind 
wandering meant that they were thinking about something completely unrelated to the task 
(e.g. thoughts about what to eat for dinner, thoughts about plans with friends or about an 
upcoming test, etc.). They were given further instructions that, in the case that they 
experienced any mind wandering, they should indicate whether the mind wandering was 
engaged intentionally (deliberately) or unintentionally (spontaneously). Participants then 
completed a short 18 trial practice phase, followed by a single example of a thought probe. 
After the practice phase, they completed 900 experimental trials, with intermittent thought 
probes. Altogether, the experiment took approximately 25 minutes to complete. 
 Measures. Performance measures for later analysis included NOGO errors, GO-trial 
RTs, and mind wandering rates for each of the two types of mind wandering (i.e. deliberate 
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and spontaneous). NOGO errors occurred when participants failed to withhold their response 
to the digit 3. GO-trial RTs were the mean response latencies for all GO trials on which a 
response was made. Mind-wandering rates were calculated as the proportion of each type 
response provided (i.e., proportion deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering).   
Study 5 Results 
 First, we were interested in determining whether the task difficulty manipulation was 
effective. Although, to this end, one could examine NOGO error rates across the Easy and 
Difficult versions of the SART, considerable research has demonstrated that the SART is 
susceptible to speed-accuracy trade-offs, which render NOGO error rates problematic (Seli, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012; 2013; Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Jonker, Solman, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013). Specifically, it has been found that individuals who respond more 
slowly to GO trials tend to produce fewer NOGO errors. To account for speed–accuracy trade-
offs in this study, we computed a skills index (mean NOGO-trial accuracy/mean GO-trial RT; 
e.g., Marquez, Zhang, Swinnen, Meesen, & Wenderoth, 2013) for each participant. This 
method produces a value that represents the participant’s efﬁciency by accounting for both 
response speed and accuracy. A high score indicates strong performance on the task: A 
participant with a higher score has greater accuracy with a relatively faster response speed. As 
an example, if two participants were both responding at a mean speed of 500 ms, the 
participant with the higher skills index would have been more accurate in his/her responding, 
despite an equivalent response pace. The scores themselves are not meaningful values, but the 
relativity in the scores is meaningful. Because the value itself is not meaningful, and because 
the scores are very small values, we multiplied them by 1000 to reduce the number of decimal 
places. 
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 Having computed skills-index scores for each participant, we next sought to determine 
whether participants in the Easy condition achieved a higher mean skills-index score than those 
in the Difficult condition: such a finding would indicate that the Easy version of the SART was 
indeed easier than the Difficult version. An independent-samples t-test indicated that skills-
index scores were significantly higher in the Easy (M = 2.80, SD = 0.41, N = 57) than the 
Difficult (M = 1.32, SD = 1.26, N = 56) version of the SART, t(111) = 8.42, SE = 0.18, p < 
.001, d =  1.77, thereby confirming that the task-difficulty manipulation was effective.  
 Next, we examined the possibility that the relative proportions of Deliberate and 
Spontaneous mind wandering differed as a function of task difficulty. In particular, we 
expected to observe more Deliberate mind wandering in the Easy relative to the Difficult 
condition, and more Spontaneous mind wandering in the Difficult relative to the Easy 
condition. To examine this hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (Condition: Easy vs. Difficult) by 2 
(Mind-Wandering Type: Deliberate vs. Spontaneous) mixed ANOVA with proportion of 
Report Type as the dependent variable (See Figure 6). The main effect of Condition was not 
significant, F(1,111) = 0.63, MSE = 0.027, p = .429, ηp
 2
 = .01. There was, however, a 
significant main effect of Report Type, F(1,111) = 28.37, MSE = 0.40, p < .001, ηp
 2
 = .20, 
indicating higher reports of Spontaneous than Deliberate mind wandering when collapsing 
across Condition. Most critically, there was also a significant Condition by Report Type 
interaction, F(1,111) = 10.62, MSE = 0.40, p = .001, ηp
 2
 = .09. To follow up on this 
interaction, we next conducted two independent-samples t-tests to determine whether there 
was, as predicted, (1) more Deliberate mind wandering in the Easy relative to the difficult 
condition, and (2) more Spontaneous mind wandering in the Difficult relative to the Easy 
condition. The first t-test indicated a significant difference in the proportion of Deliberate mind 
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wandering across the two Conditions, with more Deliberate mind wandering in the Easy than 
the Difficult condition, t(111) = 2.15, SE = 0.07, p = .034, d =  0.41. The second t-test 
indicated a significant difference in the proportion of Spontaneous mind wandering across the 
conditions, with higher proportions of Spontaneous mind wandering in the Difficult than the 
Easy condition t(111) = 2.85, SE = 0.04, p = .005, d =  0.54.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of Deliberate and Spontaneous mind wandering as a function of 
Condition (Easy vs. Difficult). Error bars are one standard error of the mean.  
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Study 5 Discussion 
 In the present study, although a manipulation of task difficulty did not result in varying 
rates of overall mind wandering across and easy and a difficult condition, it did produce very 
different distributions of the type of mind wandering engaged in each of these conditions.  
Specifically, results indicated higher levels of deliberate mind wandering and lower levels of 
spontaneous mind wandering in the easy relative to the difficult condition. This finding is of 
importance because it indicates that experimental manipulations can produce equivalent rates 
of overall mind wandering across conditions, but that the type of mind wandering engaged in 
each of these conditions might vary dramatically. Given recent evidence suggesting that the 
causes and consequences of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering may be quite different 
in certain scenarios (e.g., Carriere et al., 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, et 
al., 2015; Seli, Smallwood, et al., 2015), it is clearly important for research to examine the 
relative proportions of these types of mind wandering in order to more effectively elucidate the 
causes and consequences of mind wandering.  
 In the majority of research reports on the topic, mind wandering is characterized as a 
unidimensional construct that reflects unintentional, internally-focused thought (e.g., Baars, 
2010; Carciofo, Du et al., 2014; He et al., 2011; Klinger, 2009; Kane & McVay, 2012; Mason 
et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2010; O’Callaghan et al., 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; 
Smallwood, O’Connor et at., 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden et al., 2007; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Indeed, in their seminal work on the topic, Smallwood 
and Schooler (2006) defined mind wandering in opposition to deliberately engaged thoughts, 
such as goal-directed processing. However, consistent with previous work (e.g., Carriere et al., 
2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015; Seli, Smallwood, et al., 2015), 
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the present results demonstrate that a considerable proportion of reported episodes of mind 
wandering in fact reflects intentionally engaged thoughts. Thus, this result indicates that, in the 
case that researchers seek to maintain a unidimensional conceptualization of mind wandering 
as reflecting unintentional thought, it is clearly important that they isolate such thoughts by 
separating them from those the occur with deliberation; otherwise, there is the very real 
possibility that these thoughts will be conflated with those that are engaged with deliberation, 
which, according to such conceptualizations, would not qualify as mind wandering, per se. 
 As noted in the Introduction, considerable research has demonstrated that mind 
wandering varies as a function of task difficulty, with more mind wandering occurring during 
easy relative to difficult task (e.g., Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013; Thomson, Besner, & 
Smilek, 2013). The most widely accepted explanation of this common finding is that easy tasks 
require the employment of few executive resources for good performance, which therefore 
affords people the opportunity to mind-wander without incurring much in the way of 
performance costs; on the other hand, good performance on difficult tasks requires the 
employment of many executive resources, leaving few resources available to be devoted to 
mind wandering (thus, mind-wandering rates are low in difficult tasks; e.g., Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). Surprisingly, in the present study, despite the fact that the “easy” task was 
demonstrably easier than the “difficult” task, results did not reveal higher rates of overall mind 
wandering in the easy relative to the difficult condition, as has been frequently observed in the 
literature. In considering why this might have been the case, it is important to note that the 
reason the Sequential SART (i.e., the “easy” task) is in fact easier than the Standard SART 
(i.e., the difficult task) is because the former allows for strategic (controlled) processing 
whereas the latter does not. However, in most (if not all) studies examining mind wandering as 
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a function of task difficulty, the easier tasks require less control than the difficult tasks (e.g., 
Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013; Thomson et al., 2013). Thus, in the present case, it is 
plausible that performance was better in the easy task than in the hard task, not because the two 
tasks required different amounts of resources overall (indeed, the requirement to discriminate 
between GO digits and NOGO digits was the same across both tasks), but instead because, in 
the easy task, participants were afforded the opportunity to use their resources more 
strategically; indeed, this is evidenced by their improved performance and more opportunistic 
deliberate mind wandering. This interpretation opens up the interesting possibility that the 
relation of task difficulty and mind wandering may be more nuanced than initially conceived, 
and it may help to explain the seemingly contradictory finding that, in some cases, mind 
wandering is greater during difficult relative to easy tasks (e.g., Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 
2013). Of course, to examine this possibility, future research will need to assess the 
intentionality of mind wandering, and to specifically examine the relative proportions of 
deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering across various conditions.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 In this series of studies, I have shown that (1) participants experience deliberate and 
spontaneous mind wandering at both the trait- and state-levels, and (2) these two types of mind 
wandering sometimes differentially associate with variables of theoretical interest (and are 
therefore dissociable), and (3) conflating these two types of mind wandering can mask the 
relative influence of each type of mind wandering, which can in turn lead to underdeveloped 
(or even incorrect) theoretical conclusions. The critical point raised by these findings is clear 
and requires little in the way of elaboration: The vast majority of mind-wandering researchers 
have assumed that their indices of mind wandering have exclusively homed in on 
unintentional, internally-focused thought, but the results of the present series of studies clearly 
suggests that this has not been the case. Put differently, the present results suggest that research 
on mind wandering has been unwittingly confounding intentional and unintentional types of 
internally-focused thought. Although this represents a serious problem for the literature on 
mind wandering, fortunately, the solution to this problem is straightforward: In future 
investigations on the topic, researchers should clearly distinguish between deliberate and 
spontaneous types of mind wandering – both at the trait and state level – and discuss results in 
terms of the individual contributions of these two separate modes of thinking.  
 Although the articulation of concern and subsequent exploration into the validity of a 
basic definition central to a sub-field was specifically and selectively applied to the area of 
mind wandering in this dissertation, the work outlined here has implications for psychology as 
a whole. That is, as it was found to be the case that an essential construct within the area of 
mind wandering was shown to be incomplete and in need of refining, despite the uncritical 
adoption and application of these terms by researchers in this area, one is left to ponder what 
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other central tenets of psychological theory may require more critical concern regarding their 
validity and articulation. Quine noted that "The less a science has advanced, the more its 
terminology tends to rest on an uncritical assumption of mutual understanding", and given the 
infancy of mind wandering relative to the broader field of psychological science, it seems 
reasonable to assume that issues such as those described here might be unique to the area. 
However, one should also consider that logical leaps can continually be made from faulty 
premises, and that without careful consideration, the field of psychological science may yet 
burgeon on using ill-informed and underspecified definitions, in turn rendering our advances 
inconsequential when the true nature of these concepts is eventually illuminated through 
critical analysis of the most basic issue of all: clearly and precisely agreeing on how to define 
the object of study. Accordingly, on the basis of my intellectual adventure described herein, I 
continually will advocate the questioning of the foundations of our science with the aim of 
attaining more clarity in our quest to understand our minds and how they wander. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
References 
Adler, L. A., Spencer, T., Faraone, S. V., Kessler, R. C., Howes, M. J., Biederman, J., & 
Secnik, K. (2006). Validity of pilot adult ADHD self-report scale (ASRS) to rate adult 
ADHD Symptoms. Annals of Clinical Psychiatry, 18, 145-148. 
Baars, B. J. (2010). Spontaneous repetitive thoughts can be adaptive: Postscript on “mind 
wandering”. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 208-210. 
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. (2006). Using self-report 
assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13, 27-45. 
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., Mrazek, M. D., Kam, J. W., Franklin, M. S., & Schooler, J. W. 
(2012). Inspired by distraction mind wandering facilitates creative incubation. 
Psychological Science, 23, 1117-1122. 
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2011). Back to the future: Autobiographical 
planning and the functionality of mind-wandering. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 
1604-1611. 
Bargh, J. A. (1990). Goal and intent: goal-directed thought and behavior are often 
unintentional. Psychological Inquiry, 1, 248-251. 
Barkley, R. A., & Fischer, M. (2011). Predicting impairment in major life activities and 
occupational functioning in hyperactive children as adults: Self-reported executive 
function (EF) deficits versus EF tests. Developmental Neuropsychology, 36, 137-161.  
Barkley, R. A. (1997). Behavioral inhibition, sustained attention, and executive functions: 
constructing a unifying theory of ADHD. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 65-94. 
 102 
 
Barkley, R. A., Koplowitz, S., Anderson, T., & McMurray, M. B. (1997). Sense of time in 
children with ADHD: Effects of duration, distraction, and stimulant medication. 
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 3, 359-369. 
Barron, E., Riby, L. M., Greer, J., & Smallwood, J. (2011). Absorbed in thought: The effect of 
mind wandering on the processing of relevant and irrelevant events. Psychological 
Science, 22, 596-601. 
Bartlett, F (1958). Thinking: An experimental and social study. London: Unwin University 
Books. 
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role 
in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-
848.  
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., & George, A. (1956). Austin. 1956. A study of thinking. New 
York, John Wiley & Sons.  
Carciofo, R., Du, F., Song, N., & Zhang, K. (2014). Mind wandering, sleep quality, affect, and 
chronotype: An exploratory study. PloS one. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0091285 
Carriere, J. S. A., Seli, P., & Smilek, D. (2013). Wandering in both mind and body: Individual 
differences in self-reported mind wandering and inattention predict fidgeting. Canadian 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, 19-31. 
Cheyne, J. A., Solman, G. J. F., Carriere, J. S. A., & Smilek, D. (2009). Anatomy of an error: 
A bidirectional stage model of task engagement/disengagement and attention-related 
errors. Cognition, 111, 89-113. 
 103 
 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Experience 
sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to 
mind wandering. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 8719-8724. 
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments 
examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological 
Bulletin, 125, 627-668. 
DeShazo B. T., Lyman, R. D., & Klinger, L. G. (2002). Academic underachievement and 
attentiondeficit/ hyperactivity disorder: the negative impact of symptom severity on 
school performance. Journal of School Psychology, 40, 259–283. 
Farley, J., Risko, E. F., & Kingstone, A. (2013). Everyday attention and lecture retention: the 
effects of time, fidgeting, and mind wandering. Frontiers in Psychology. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00619 
Fassbender, C., Zhang, H., Buzy, W. M., Cortes, C. R., Mizuiri, D., Beckett, L., & Schweitzer, 
J. B. (2009). A lack of default network suppression is linked to increased distractibility 
in ADHD. Brain Research, 1273, 114-128. 
Feng, S., D’Mello, S., & Graesser, A. C. (2013). Mind wandering while reading easy and 
difficult texts. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20, 586-592. 
Fergusson, D. M., & Horwood, L. J. (1995). Early disruptive behavior, IQ, and later school 
achievement and delinquent behavior. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 183–
199. 
Forster, S. & Lavie, N. (2009). Harnessing the wandering mind: The role of perceptual  
 load. Cognition, 111, 345-355. 
 104 
 
Franklin, M.S., Mrazek, M.D., Anderson, C.L., Smallwood., J., Kingstone, A., & Schooler., 
J.W. (2015). Tracking distraction: The relationship between mind-wandering, meta 
awareness, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptomatology. Journal of 
Attention Disorders. doi: 0.1177/1087054714543494 
Giambra, L. M. (1989). Task-unrelated thought frequency as a function of age: A laboratory 
study. Psychology and Aging, 4, 136-143. 
Giambra, L. M. (1995). A laboratory method for investigating influences on switching 
attention to task-unrelated imagery and thought. Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 1-21. 
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 
306-355. 
Gorgolewski, K. J., Lurie, D., Urchs, S., Kipping, J. A., Craddock, R. C., Milham, M. P., ... & 
Smallwood, J. (2014). A correspondence between individual differences in the brain's 
intrinsic functional architecture and the content and form of self-generated thoughts. 
PloS One. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0097176 
Hancock, P. A. (2013). In search of vigilance: The problem of iatrogenically created 
psychological phenomena. American Psychologist, 68, 97-109. 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable 
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling. Retrieved from 
http://www.afhayes.com/public/process2012.pdf 
He, J., Becic, E., Lee, Y. C., & McCarley, J. S. (2011). Mind wandering behind the wheel 
performance and oculomotor correlates. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society, 53, 13-21. 
 105 
 
Hinshaw, S. P. (1992). Academic underachievement, attention deficits, and aggression: 
comorbidity and implications for intervention. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 60, 893–903. 
Hinshaw, S. P. (1994). Externalizing behavior problems and academic underachievement in 
childhood and adolescence: causal relationships and underlying mechanisms. 
Psychological Bulletin, 111, 127–155. 
Humphreys, M. S., & Revelle, W. (1984). Personality, motivation, and performance: a theory 
of the relationship between individual differences and information processing. 
Psychological review, 91, 153-184. 
Jackson, J. D., & Balota, D. A. (2012). Mind-wandering in younger and older adults: 
Converging evidence from the sustained attention to response task and reading for 
comprehension. Psychology & Aging, 27, 106-119. 
Jackson, J. D., Weinstein, Y., & Balota, D. A. (2013). Can mind-wandering be timeless? 
Atemporal focus and aging in mind-wandering paradigms. Frontiers in Psychology. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00742 
Johnston, C., Mash, E. J., Miller, N., & Ninowski, J. E. (2012). Parenting in adults with 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Clinical Psychology Review, 32, 215-
228. 
Jonker, T. R., Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2013). Performance reactivity in a 
continuous-performance task: Implications for understanding post-error behavior. 
Consciousness & Cognition, 22, 1468-1476. 
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. 
(2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study of 
 106 
 
working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 18, 614-
621. 
Kane, M. J., & McVay, J. C. (2012). What mind wandering reveals about executive-control 
abilities and failures. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 348-354. 
Kaufman, S. B., & Singer, J. L. (2011, December 22). The origins of positive-constructive 
daydreaming [Web log comment]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2011/12/22/the-origins-of-positive-
constructive-daydreaming/ 
Killingsworth, M. A. & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. Science, 
330, 932. 
Kessler, R. C., Adler, L. A., Barkley, R., Biederman, J., Conners, C. K., Faraone, S. V., … 
Zaslavsky, A. M. (2005). Patterns and predictors of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder persistence into adulthood: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication. Biological Psychiatry, 57, 1442–1451. 
Kline, R. B. (1998). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. New York, NY: 
Guilford Press. 
Klinger, E. (2009). Daydreaming and fantasizing: Thought flow and motivation. In K. D. 
Markman, W. M. P. Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of imagination and mental 
simulation (pp. 225–239). NewYork, NY: Psychology Press. 
Knowles, D., & Tay, R. (2002). Driver inattention: More risky than the fatal four? Proceedings 
of the 2002 Road Safety Research, Policing and Education Conference, Adelaide, SA,  
pp. 377–392. 
 107 
 
Krause, J., Krause, K.-H., Dresel, S. H., la Fougere, C., & Ackenheil, M. (2006). ADHD in 
adolescence and adulthood, with a special focus on the dopamine transporter and 
nicotine. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 8, 29–36. 
Kurzban, R., Duckworth, A., Kable, J. W., & Myers, J. (2013). An opportunity cost model of 
subjective effort and task performance. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 36, 661-679.  
Levinson, D. B., Smallwood, J., & Davidson, R. J. (2012). The persistence of thought: 
Evidence for a role of working memory in the maintenance of task-unrelated thinking. 
Psychological Science, 23, 375-380. 
Lenzner, A., Schnotz, W., & Müller, A. (2013). The role of decorative pictures in 
learning. Instructional Science, 41, 811-831. 
Mannuzza, S., Castellanos, F. X., Roizen, E. R., Hutchison, J. A., Lashua, E. C., & Klein, R. 
G. (2011). Impact of the impairment  criterion  in  the  diagnosis  of  adult  ADHD:  33-
year follow-up study of boys With ADHD. Journal of Attention Disorders, 15, 122-
129. 
Marquez, C. M. S., Zhang, X., Swinnen, S. P., Meesen, R., & Wenderoth, N. (2013). Task-
specific effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on motor learning. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 7:333, doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00333 
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C. N. 
(2007). Wandering minds: the default network and stimulus-independent thought. 
Science, 315, 393-395. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: working memory 
capacity, goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control task. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 196. 
 108 
 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2010). Does mind wandering reflect executive function or 
executive failure? Comment on Smallwood and Schooler (2006) and Watkins (2008). 
Psychological Bulletin, 136, 188-197. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2013). Dispatching the wandering mind? Toward a laboratory 
method for cuing “spontaneous” off-task thought. Frontiers in Psychology. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00570 
Mooneyham, B. W. & Schooler, J. W. (2013). The costs and benefits of mind-wandering: A 
review. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, 11-18. 
Mrazek, M. D., Chin, J. M., Schmader, T., Hartson, K. A., Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. 
(2011). Threatened to distraction: Mind-wandering as a consequence of stereotype 
threat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1243-1248. 
Mrazek, M. D., Phillips, D. T., Franklin, M. S., Broadway, J. M., & Schooler, J. W. (2013). 
Young & restless: Validation of the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ) reveals 
disruptive impact of mind-wandering for youth. Frontiers in Psychology. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00560 
Mrazek, M. D., Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2012). Mindfulness and mind-wandering: 
Finding convergence through opposing constructs. Emotion, 12, 442-448. 
Neisser, U. (1963). The multiplicity of thought. British Journal of Psychology, 54, 1-14. 
Nigg, J. T., Butler, K. M., Huang-Pollock, C. L., & Henderson, J. M. (2002). Inhibitory 
processes in adults with persistent childhood onset ADHD. Journal of consulting and 
clinical psychology, 70, 153-157. 
O’Callaghan, C., Shine, J. M., Lewis, S. J., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Irish, M. (2015). Shaped 
by our thoughts–A new task to assess spontaneous cognition and its associated neural 
 109 
 
correlates in the default network. Brain and Cognition, 93, 1-10. 
Orne, M. T. (2009). Demand characteristics and the concept of quasi-controls. Artifacts in 
Behavioral Research: Robert Rosenthal and Ralph L. Rosnow’s Classic Books, 110. 
Ottaviani, C., & Couyoumdjian, A. (2013). Pros and cons of a wandering mind: A prospective 
study. Frontiers in Psychology. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00524 
Ottaviani, C, Shapiro, D., & Couyoumdjian, A. (2013). Flexibility as the key for somatic 
health: From mind wandering to perseverative cognition. Biological Psychology, 94, 
38–43. 
Overbey, G. A., Snell, W. E., & Callis, K. E. (2011). Subclinical ADHD, stress, and coping in 
romantic relationships of university students. Journal of Attention Disorders, 15, 67–
78. 
Pashler, H., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2012). Editors’ Introduction to the Special Section on 
Replicability in Psychological Science A Crisis of Confidence?. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 528-530. 
Pintrich, P. R. (1999). The role of motivation in promoting and sustaining self-regulated 
learning. International Journal of Educational Research, 31, 459-470. 
Pintrich, P. R. & De Groot, E. V. (1990). Motivational and self-regulated learning components 
of classroom academic performance. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 33-40. 
Polanczyk, G., & Rohde, L. A. (2007). Epidemiology of attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder across the lifespan. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 20, 386-392. 
Porrino, L. J., Rapoport, J. L., Behar, D., Sceery, W., Ismond, D. R., & Bunney Jr, W. E. 
(1983). A naturalistic assessment of the motor activity of hyperactive boys: I. 
Comparison with normal controls. Archives of General Psychiatry, 40, 681-687. 
 110 
 
Quine, W. (1936). Truth by convention. In O. Lee (Ed.), Philosophical essays for Alfred North 
Whitehead (pp. 90–124). New York: Longmans, Green and Co.  
Risko, E. F., Anderson, N., Sarwal, A., Engelhardt, M., & Kingstone, A. (2012). Everyday 
attention: Variation in mind wandering and memory in a lecture. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 26, 234–242. 
Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Baddeley, B. T., & Yiend, J. (1997).  ‘Oops!’: Performance 
correlates of everyday attentional failures in traumatic brain injured and normal 
subjects.  Neuropsychologia, 35, 747-758. 
Ruby, F. J., Smallwood, J., Engen, H., & Singer, T. (2013). How self-generated thought shapes 
mood—the relation between mind-wandering and mood depends on the socio-temporal 
content of thoughts. PloS One, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0077554 
Saegert, S., Swap, W., & Zajonc, R. B. (1973). Exposure, context, and interpersonal attraction. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 234-242. 
Sayette, M. A., Reichle, E. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Lost in the sauce the effects of 
alcohol on mind wandering. Psychological Science, 20, 747-752. 
Schneider, R. J., Hough, L. M., & Dunnette, M. D. (1996). Broadsided by broad traits: How to 
sink science in five dimensions or less. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 17, 639-
655. 
Schiefele, J., Krapp, A., & Winteler, A. (1992). Interest as a predictor of academic 
achievement: A meta-analysis of research. In K. A. Renninger, S. Hidi, & A. Krapp 
(Eds.). The role of interest in learning and development. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience and 
 111 
 
meta-consciousness. Trends in cognitive sciences, 6, 339-344. 
Schooler, J. W., Reichle, E. D., & Halpern, D. V. (2005). Zoning-out during reading: Evidence 
for dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. In D. T. Levin (Ed.), 
Thinking and seeing: Visual metacognition in adults and children (pp. 204–226). 
Cambridge, MA:MIT Press. 
Seli, P., Carriere, J. S., Levene, M., & Smilek, D. (2013). How few and far between? 
Examining the effects of probe rate on self-reported mind wandering. Frontiers in 
Psychology. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00430 
Seli, P., Carriere, J. S. A., & Smilek, D. (2014). Not all mind-wandering is created equal: 
Dissociating deliberate from spontaneous mind-wandering. Psychological Research. 
doi: 10.1007/s00426-014-0617-x 
Seli, P., Carriere, J. S. A., Thomson, D. R., Cheyne, J. A., Martens, K. A. E, & Smilek, D. 
(2014).  Restless mind, restless body.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 40, 660-668. 
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., Barton, K. R., & Smilek, D. (2012). Consistency of sustained attention 
across modalities: Comparing visual and auditory versions of the SART. Canadian 
Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 
66, 44-50. 
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2013). Wandering minds and wavering rhythms: Linking 
mind wandering and behavioral variability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception & Performance, 1, 1-5.  
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., Xu, M., Purdon, C., & Smilek, D. (2015). Motivation, Intentionality, 
and Mind-wandering: Implications for Assessments of Task-Unrelated Thought. 
 112 
 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000116 
Seli, P., Jonker, T. R., Solman, G. J., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2013). A methodological 
note on evaluating performance in a sustained-attention-to-response task. Behavior 
research methods, 45, 355-363. 
Seli, P., Jonker, T. R., Cheyne, J. A., Cortes, K, & Smilek, D. (2015). Can research participants 
comment authoritatively on the validity of their self-reports of mind wandering and task 
engagement? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000029 
Seli, P., Smallwood, J., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2015). On the relation of mind wandering 
and ADHD symptomatology. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. doi: 10.3758/s13423-
014-0793-0 
Shaw, G. A., & Giambra, L. M. (1993). Task unrelated thoughts of college students diagnosed 
as hyperactive in childhood. Developmental Neuropsychology, 9, 17-30.  
Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: a process-occurrence 
framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychological Bulletin, 139, 519–535.  
Smallwood, J., Andrews-Hanna, J. (2013). Not all minds that wander are lost: The importance 
of a balanced perspective on the mind wandering state. Frontiers in Psychology. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00441 
Smallwood, J., Baracaia, S. F., Lowe, M., & Obonsawin, M. C. (2003). Task-unrelated thought 
whilst encoding information. Consciousness & Cognition, 12, 452–484. 
Smallwood, J., Beach, E., Schooler, J. W., & Handy, T. C. (2008). Going AWOL in the brain: 
Mind wandering reduces cortical analysis of external events. Journal of Cognitive 
 113 
 
Neuroscience, 20, 458-469. 
Smallwood, J., Davies, J. B., Heim, D., Finnigan, F., Sudberry, M., O'Connor, R., & 
Obonsawin, M. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional lapse: Task 
engagement and disengagement during sustained attention. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 13, 657-690. 
Smallwood, J., Fitzgerald, A., Miles, L. K., & Phillips, L. H. (2009). Shifting moods, 
wandering minds: Negative moods lead the mind to wander. Emotion, 9, 271-276. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., Luus, B., & Schooler, J. (2008). Segmenting the stream of 
consciousness: The psychological correlates of temporal structures in the time series 
data of a continuous performance task. Brain and Cognition, 66, 50-56. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2007). The lights are on but no one’s 
home: Meta-awareness and the decoupling of attention when the mind wanders. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 527-533. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). When attention matters: The 
curious incident of the wandering mind. Memory & Cognition, 36, 1144-1150. 
Smallwood, J., Nind, L., & O’Connor, R. C. (2009). When is your head at? An exploration of 
the factors associated with the temporal focus of the wandering mind. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 18, 118-125. 
Smallwood, J., Obonsawin, M., & Heim, D. (2003). Task unrelated thought: The role of 
distributed processing. Consciousness & Cognition, 12, 169-189. 
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., Sudberry, M. V., & Ballantyne, C. (2004). The consequences 
of encoding information on the maintenance of internally generated images and 
thoughts: The role of meaning complexes. Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 789-820. 
 114 
 
 
Smallwood, J., O'Connor, R. C., Sudberry, M. V., & Obonsawin, M. (2007). Mind-wandering 
and dysphoria. Cognition & Emotion, 21, 816-842. 
Smallwood, J., Ruby, F. J., & Singer, T. (2013). Letting go of the present: mind-wandering is 
associated with reduced delay discounting. Consciousness and cognition, 22, 1-7. 
Smallwood, J. & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 946-
958. 
Smilek, D., Carriere, J. S., & Cheyne, J. A. (2010). Out of mind, out of sight: Eye blinking as 
indicator and embodiment of mind wandering. Psychological Science, 21, 786-789. 
Smith, G. T., Fischer, S., & Fister, S. M. (2003). Incremental validity principles in test 
construction. Psychological Assessment, 4, 467-477.  
Struthers, C. W., Perry, R. P., & Menec, V. H. (2000). An examination of the relationship 
among academic stress, coping, motivation, and performance in college. Research in 
Higher Education, 41, 581-592. 
Szpunar, K. K., Jing, H. G., & Schacter, D. L. (2014). Overcoming overconfidence in learning 
from video-recorded lectures: Implications of interpolated testing for online education. 
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 3, 161-164. 
Szpunar, K. K., Khan, N. Y., & Schacter, D. L. (2013). Interpolated memory tests reduce mind 
wandering and improve learning of online lectures. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 110, 6313-6317 
Thomson, D. R., Besner, D., & Smilek, D. (2013). In pursuit of off-task thought: Mind 
wandering-performance trade-offs while reading aloud and color naming. Frontiers in 
Psychology. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00360 
 115 
 
Unsworth, N., & McMillan, B. D. (2013). Mind wandering and reading comprehension: 
Examining the roles of working memory capacity, interest, motivation, and topic 
experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
39, 832-842. 
Vinski, M. T., & Watter, S. (2013). Being a grump only makes things worse: a transactional 
account of acute stress on mind wandering. Frontiers in psychology. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00730 
Webster, M., & J. Sell (2007). Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences. London: 
Academic Press. 
Winstanley, C. A., Eagle, D. M., & Robbins, T. W. (2006). Behavioral models of impulsivity 
in relation to ADHD: translation between clinical and preclinical studies. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 26, 379-395. 
Whalen, C. K., Jamner, L. D., Henker, B., Gehricke, J.-G., & King, P. S. (2003). Is there a link 
between adolescent cigarette smoking and pharmacotherapy for ADHD? Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 17, 332–335. 
Zavagnin, M., Borella, E., & De Beni, R. (2014). When the mind wanders: Age-related 
differences between young and older adults. Acta Psychologica, 145, 54-64. 
Zylowska, L., Ackerman, D. L., Yang, M. H., Futrell, J. L., Horton, N. L., Hale, T. S., ... & 
Smalley, S. L. (2008). Mindfulness meditation training in adults and adolescents with 
ADHD a feasibility study. Journal of Attention Disorders, 11, 737-746. 
 
 
 
 
